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Over the past 50 years, scholars have examined the effects of industrial activity on the 
natural environment and why firms should willingly spend resources to reduce their 
environmental impacts. While scholars have identified numerous economic benefits that accrue 
to firms prioritizing environmental performance, firms still vary considerably in the manner and 
extent to which they address their hazardous waste. Recent studies have placed an emphasis on 
business context and what differentiates firms’ responses to societal concerns. However, we still 
know very little about how divided corporate ownership influences environmental outcomes. 
This dissertation examines whether, when, and why divided corporate ownership affects the 
emission and mitigation of hazardous waste known to adversely impact human health.  
I first ask whether and when divided ownership influences facilities’ emissions and 
mitigation of hazardous waste and examine if perceived harm (cancerous and non-cancerous 
hazards) encourages greater precautions. I then take a closer examination of JV ownership 
coalitions to explore the mechanisms by which divided ownership influences the mitigation, 
namely the recycling and treatment, of cancerous and non-cancerous hazardous waste. I find 
robust empirical evidence that co-ownership, ownership dispersion (i.e. the number of partners 
and their balance of equity), the types of owners collaborating in a JV, coalition heterogeneity, 
and chemical classifications influence the extent and manner in which JV facilities address their 






Overall, this dissertation demonstrates when co-ownership detracts from environmental 
performance and broadens theoretical accounts of ownership’s nuanced social sensitivity to 
hazardous externalities.   
 
Keywords: Joint Ventures, Environmental Performance, Hazardous Emissions, Pollution 
Mitigation, Ownership Dispersion, Coalition Heterogeneity
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Chapter 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 For over 50 years, business scholars have examined the environmental consequences of 
industrial activity. While society accepts that some hazardous byproducts are a natural result of 
production (Coase, 1988), scholars have increasingly studied the reasons why firms should 
voluntarily spend additional resources to go above and beyond legal requirements to protect the 
general public from known harm. Normative prescriptions of moral duty have exhibited only 
limited success in changing organizational behaviour, so emphasis has shifted towards enticing 
firms to mitigate harm by building the business case for environmental sustainability and 
identifying how it “pays” (Griffin & Mahon, 2003; Margolis & Walsh, 2001; Roman, Hayibor, 
& Agle, 1999; Burke & Logsdon, 1996). Moral-duty perspectives remain, but, increasingly, 
scholars recognize that change will occur more quickly by linking sustainability to traditional 
organizational objectives (Marcus & Fremeth, 2009).  
 Many studies in the 1990s and 2000s appealed to the economic self-interest of 
organizations by establishing the link between environmental and financial performance. For 
example, scholars have theorized and found evidence that pursuits of environmental performance 
improve financial performance by creating strategic benefits (Porter & van der Linde, 1995), 
providing learning opportunities (Larpe, Mukherjee, & Van Wassenhove, 2000), reducing risks 
(Shrivastava, 1995) and liabilities (Rooney, 1993), lowering the costs of capital (Sharfman & 
Fernando, 2008), lowering costs of materials usage (Hart, 1995) and hazardous waste disposal 
fees (Young, 1991), increasing sales (Bagnoli & Watts, 2003), and improving production 
efficiency (Sprinkle & Maines, 2010; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997).  
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Meta-analyses concur that pursuits of the common good can pay off or break even 
without sacrificing profits (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Reynes, 
2003), but others highlight that firms pursue environmental sustainability when it pays not 
necessarily because it pays (Reinhardt & Stavins, 2010; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005). In other 
words, firms evaluate the economic and/or strategic advantages of socially beneficial 
investments and pursue them when the predicted returns exceed their costs. Despite all the 
advantages associated with a corporate focus on environmental performance, a wide and 
persistent variance in environmental outcomes still separates those firms embracing 
environmental sustainability from those avoiding the topic altogether.  
This research is inspired by an interest in understanding why seemingly similar 
organizations differ in the extent to which they control foreseeable harm arising from their 
activities. Neither the traditional normative prescriptions for moral duty nor the profit-enticing 
empirical accounts appear adequately equipped to answer systematic sources of variance in 
environmental outcomes. A growing consensus of executives recognize the importance of 
working within society’s expectations and avoiding activities that societies deem unacceptable 
(Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2004), calling into question a lack of conviction to address 
stakeholders who increasingly expect firms to reduce their environmental impacts. Further, “two 
decades of tightening regulatory rules and legal threats have led many businesspeople to assume 
that any hazards and harms that their enterprise engenders, even if not clearly illegal today, will 
sooner or later be subject to public censure, government action, and legal liability” (p. 308), 
calling into question a strategic choice to ignore environmental hazards or an inability to 
recognize their importance.  
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More recent extensions within the sustainability literature focus upon firms’ differences 
and their unique sensitivities to the costs and benefits of environmental performance (van de Ven 
& Jeurissen, 2005). Herein lies the frontier of sustainability research – determining when, why, 
and how situational context matters to environmental performance. Different types of 
organizations have differential access to resources that can affect their costs for social 
investments (Darnall & Edwards, 2006). Different firms have different constituencies exhibiting 
unique environmental preferences (Sharma, 2000; Branzei et al., 2004). Certain types of firms, 
such as publically traded corporations, find themselves more exposed to public scrutiny than 
others, leading them to invest more heavily in the common good (Lee, 2009). Owners account 
for value differently, which can differentiate social investments (Berrone et al., 2010; Westhead, 
Cowling, & Howorth, 2001; Birley, Ng, & Godfrey, 1999; Fletcher, 2000).  
While research is beginning to uncover why individual firms, given their unique 
situational contexts, differ in the extent to which they invest in the common good, we still know 
very little about how joint-venture (JV) partnerships between firms, each with unique 
preferences, affect environmental outcomes. Reconciling social investments with financial 
objectives is difficult enough for individual firms (Margolis et al., 2007; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 
2005). Reconciling social investments with multiple organizations’ unique characteristics, 
constituencies, preferences, and financial objectives appears to be a formidable challenge. 
In August 2011, ConocoPhillips was blamed for an oil spill off of China’s coast in the 
Bohai Sea; in April 2012, the company agreed to pay approximately $297 million in 
compensation (Rapoza, 2012). ConocoPhillips, the minority operating partner of a 51-49% joint-
venture (JV) with the China National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC), immediately notified 
the Chinese government about the spill, but clean-up operations were delayed for weeks.  
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ConocoPhillips complained that its joint-venture partner prevented containment of the spill in a 
timely manner (Watts, 2011). CNOOC had allegedly insisted on contracting with one of its 
Chinese affiliate companies for environmental emergencies rather than using ConocoPhillips’ 
own service provider, which could respond to environmental emergencies anywhere in the world 
within 24 hours. These co-ordination challenges for building social value through protecting the 
environment eventually resulted in an uncontained oil spill the size of London (U.K.), 
significantly affecting the Chinese fishing and tourism industries (Kuang et al., 2012).  
This incident, and especially the division of interest and blame between the two partners, 
provides anecdotal evidence that co-ownership creates difficulties for co-ordinating collective 
action for environmental objectives. It raises important new questions for sustainability scholars 
about the role corporate ownership plays in environmental performance  – specifically, how and 
why co-ownership influences JV’s ability to reduce environmental impacts. 
In this thesis, I take an in-depth examination of co-ownership to explore whether, when, 
why, and how co-ownership influences two aspects of environmental performance – hazardous 
emissions and pollution mitigation. I explore not only the additional challenges that JV 
organizations face in identifying common interests and agreeing upon collective action, but also 
how the characteristics of a JV’s ownership coalition and its members systematically influence 
cancerous and non-cancerous waste processing. I find strong evidence that co-ownership, the 
characteristics of JV partners, and the characteristics of the ownership coalition influence the 
extent to which facilities address hazardous byproducts.   
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1.1 Joint Ventures and Environmental Performance 
Joint-venture (JV) scholars have long recognized the challenges of co-ordinating multiple 
owners’ divergent interests (Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Cartwright & Zander, 1968; van de 
Ven, 1976) at the facility level (Harrigan, 1988; Gill & Butler, 1996), which become increasingly 
complicated with additional owners (Graicunas, 1937). I argue that divided corporate ownership 
undermines partners’ ability to identify, agree, and act upon common interests for pursuing the 
common good. 
JVs rely heavily upon partitioning and specialization in the components of private 
property (Alchian, 2008). In forming equity JVs, corporate partners pool their resources to create 
a separate legal entity that produces some product that the individual firms cannot efficiently 
produce independently (Das & Teng, 2000). Regardless of the root cause of the inefficiency, 
each parent firm seeks complementary resources that make the enterprise viable. When JV 
partners dedicate resources to the enterprise, they increase the risk of expropriation by releasing 
control over corporate assets to a separate legal entity with multiple property rights holders 
(Mahoney, 2005).  
To manage this additional risk, JV partners negotiate a contract (a.k.a. partnership 
agreement) that defines each partner’s rights to residual claimancy and control (Libecap, 1989), 
rights of monitoring and governance (Reuer, Ariño, & Mellewigt, 2006; Kumar & Seth, 1998), 
and roles and responsibilities (Gulati & Singh, 1998). In negotiating the contractual agreement, 
partner firms attempt to build in protections against value expropriation (Williamson, 1991) 
while seeking to maximize their private net gains (Libecap, 1989). While these ex-ante 
guidelines protect individual owners’ interests, they also impede efficient decision making 
(Pearce, 1997) and create structural rigidities (Mahoney, 2005; Barzel, 1997) resistant to change 
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(Libecap, 1989). Thus, JVs appear to face greater challenges in coordinating collective action for 
pursuing socially beneficial investments.  
JV scholars provide several guideposts that identify how much ownership corresponds to 
an equity JV where minority partners actively engage in the venture, because very small equity 
owners may simply invest in the enterprise without actively participating. While anecdotal 
evidence and previous studies suggest that a minority partners can, at least, partially control a JV 
(Geringer & Herbert, 1989; Mjöen & Tallman, 1997), scholars propose that the minimum 
minority ownership for equity joint-ventures ranges between five percent (Killing, 1983) to 
twenty percent (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004). I first adopt Dhanaraj & Beamish’s (2004) more 
conservative twenty percent threshold to examine the differences between equity JVs and 
independent firms and to ensure coordination challenges are present among JV co-owners.  I 
then adopt the more liberal threshold to examine differences among JVs because I argue that 
different levels, types, and configurations of ownership influence the manner in which facilities 
deal with hazardous waste.
1
 
In Chapter 2, “The Environmental Consequences of (un)Divided Ownership,” I focus on 
how and why environmental decisions differ for JVs and independent organizations and, 
subsequently, how these differences affect hazardous emissions and pollution mitigation for 
substances with known cancerous and non-cancerous properties. Unlike their independent peers, 
when making equity allocations, JV partners face a trade-off between investment incentives and 
control-benefits extraction (Hauswald & Hege, 2009). JVs inherently raise owners’ concerns 
about control (Wang & Zhu, 2005; Kumar & Seth, 1998; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), cost 
                                                          
1
 All of the results in this thesis are robust to examining the population of JVs using a 1% equity threshold. These 
results are available from the author upon request. 
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spillovers (Richards & Yang, 2007), and benefit capture (Killing, 1983; Gulati & Singh, 1998) 
and focus owners’ attention on who contributes, who benefits, and how from each investment 
decision (Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1989; Barzel, 1997). Despite these difficulties, JV owners 
frequently align their interests to collectively pursue additional economic efficiencies (Das & 
Teng, 2000). 
Nonetheless, economic and environmental efficiencies are not always aligned; 
environmental performance typically requires trade-offs (Husted & Salazar, 2006). These trade-
offs are not exogenously determined, as JV partners tend to face the same regulatory constraints 
and institutional pressures as their independent peers. As regulation increases and society 
increasingly focuses on industrial byproducts, more convergence in environmental outcomes 
would be expected across facilities and firms, regardless of ownership.   
However, the challenges of aligning multiple owners’ interests (Killing, 1983; Parkhe, 
1993; Cartwright & Zander, 1968) could undermine investments in the common good when 
financial returns remain uncertain or incalculable. Divided ownership complicates trade-off 
decisions, reduces strategic flexibility, and impedes structural adaptability (Mahoney, 2005; 
Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989) because JVs must work within the confines of negotiated terms 
(Killing, 1983). Environmental performance investments are understood as purchases of a public 
good (Reinhardt, 1999, 1998) that require an extensive amount of sustained effort (Marcus & 
Fremeth, 2009; Falck & Heblich, 2007; King & Lennox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 1999) for 
distant and uncertain future benefits (Economist, 2009; Elkington, 1998). If any partner remains 
unwilling to make such an investment, the other partners must either forgo environmental 
performance investments or choose to incur a disproportionate cost for improving environmental 
outcomes. 
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I argue that co-ordination challenges reduce the odds of achieving consensus for 
environmental performance initiatives. As a result, I expect that JV facilities produce more 
hazardous waste, emit more hazardous waste, and address less hazardous waste through pollution 
mitigation than individually owned facilities. However, I also theorize that social forces, in the 
form of increased liability and perceived differential harm, will influence the extent to which JV 
facilities differ from independent facilities in the manner in which they deal with their cancerous 
and non-cancerous waste. I test these arguments through adopting a quasi-experimental, 
matched-pair design, a method of causal inference (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002), that contrasts 
Canadian independent and joint-venture facilities who disclosed their hazardous emissions and 
abatement efforts to Environment Canada between 2004 and 2009.  
 While Chapter 2 focuses on differences between JVs and independent firms, Chapter 3, 
“JV Ownership Coalitions and Environmental Performance,” examines how and why JVs differ 
from one another in pollution mitigation – namely, the recycling and treatment of hazardous 
waste.  Scholars theorize that firms pursue (or refrain from) environmental sustainability for 
instrumental reasons (Lynch-Wood & Williamson, 2007; Hawkins & Hutter, 1993), ranging on a 
continuum from moral-duty to profit-maximization (van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005; Scalise, 
2005; Cox & Hazen, 2003). In Chapter 3, I argue that the characteristics of a JV’s ownership 
coalition and the characteristics of the coalition’s members shift the extent to which JVs exhibit a 
moral-duty or profit-maximization tendency.  
I argue that ownership dispersion – that is, more owners with more balanced equity 
stakes – undermines partners’ ability to identify, agree, and act upon common interests for 
pursuing the common good, thus shifting the JV’s tendency toward profit maximization. 
However, I further argue that who sits at the table also matters; different types of owners have 
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different costs (Darnall & Edwards, 2006), stakeholders (Darnall, Potoski, & Prakash, 2010; 
Darnall, Henriquez, & Sadorsky, 2009), and preferences (Berrone et al., 2010; Schulze et al., 
2001) that influence the extent to which managers gravitate toward moral-duty or profit-
maximization perspectives. To test these arguments, I examine the effects of JV ownership 
dispersion, types of partners, and coalition heterogeneity on pollution mitigation for JVs 
reporting to Environment Canada’s National Pollution Release Inventory between 2004 and 
2009.   
1.2 Intended Contribution 
The intended theoretical contribution of this dissertation is explaining why and how the 
decision to collectively organize for production has consequences for how owners see and 
negotiate the interface between business and society. I explain and empirically find that co-
ownership has predictable environmental consequences. However, JV owners can and do 
overcome co-ordination challenges to reduce hazardous emissions and improve pollution 
mitigation for facility byproducts perceived to be the most detrimental to human health.  
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Chapter 2:  
The Environmental Consequences 
of (un)Divided Ownership 
 
Environmental performance has preoccupied management scholars since the late 1950s. 
The sustainability literature has evolved through several distinct periods (Marcus & Fremeth, 
2009), from humble beginnings creating awareness, to exploring ethical mandates (Levit, 1958) 
and moral responsibility (Donaldson & Davis, 1991), to building a business case for 
sustainability (Porter & van der Linde, 1995), to explicitly questioning the financial returns of 
environmentally responsible business practices and measuring the environmental impact of 
hazardous waste (King & Lenox, 2002; Russo & Fouts, 1997). While a growing consensus 
asserts that the benefits of environmental performance outweigh its costs (Reinhardt & Stavins, 
2010; Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007; Roman, Hayibor, & Agle, 1999; Russo & Fouts, 
1997), organizations still differ considerably in the manner and extent to which they address their 
hazardous byproducts.  
Some scholars ascribe variances in environmental performance to differences in 
corporate ownership (Darnall & Edwards, 2006; King & Shaver, 2001; Margolis & Walsh, 2001; 
Sethi, 2003). For instance, some argue that long-term institutional ownership increases 
investments in the common good because managers depend upon long-term investors who 
actively monitor firms and have more to gain from social investments (Neubaum & Zahara, 
2006; Johnson & Greening, 1999). Berrone et al. (2010) aver that family-controlled firms exhibit 
greater environmental performance because family owners attain additional non-economic value 
from social investments, such as an enhanced family reputation. Yet, others theorize and find 
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evidence that public firms exhibit greater environmental performance because they are more 
visible and face greater societal pressures (Lee, 2009). 
While these studies highlight how and why different kinds of owners influence firms’ 
environmental outcomes, the question of co-ownership has not received much theoretical or 
empirical attention. The only study I found on co-ownership and environmental performance 
examined firms’ use of one hazardous chemical. Lee (2009) found that joint ventures emitted 
more benzene than did public firms, and he attributed this finding to the increased visibility of 
public firms. Because co-ownership partially shelters corporate owners from public scrutiny, Lee 
(2009) suggests that JVs are more likely to engage in incidental wrongdoing (Bazerman & 
Tenbrunsel, 2011; Palmer, 2012).   
I extend Lee’s study and contribute to prior research on ownership and environmental 
performance by examining whether, how, when, theoretically why, and to what extent divided 
corporate ownership influences the emission and mitigation of hazardous byproducts. Divided 
ownership elucidates decision processes that independent firms take for granted because partners 
place additional emphasis on who contributes, who benefits, and how from each investment 
decision (Libecap, 1989). Each owner brings a unique mix of constituents and priorities that 
influence not only its own environmental strategy (Sharma, 2000) but also its social investments 
and expected returns from these investments (Berrone et al., 2010; Branzei et al., 2004). Any 
investment decisions made by co-owned facilities are more heavily scrutinized by multiple 
parties on a cost-benefit basis, and the allocation of costs and returns may be disputable. If one or 
more partners remain unwilling to invest in environmental initiatives, other partners must either 
opt out all together or choose to incur a disproportionate cost for improving environmental 
outcomes. As a result, divided corporate ownership increases the difficulty of co-ordination 
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(Killing, 1983; Parkhe, 1993; Cartwright & Zander, 1968) and reduces the odds of achieving 
consensus (Kim & Mahoney, 2002).  
I examine these arguments in the context of hazardous emissions and pollution mitigation 
for over 300 hazardous chemicals used by Canadian facilities and reported to the National 
Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI) between 2004 and 2009. The NPRI provides an ideal setting 
in which to examine the effects of divided ownership because Environment Canada sets and 
enforces systematic standards for reporting, reports facility performance publicly, and facilitates 
comparisons across environmental outcomes and/or industries. I focus specifically on the facility 
level of analysis because facilities represent the key unit of intervention and accrual for 
environmental activities (Environment Canada, 2012; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
2012a). 
I find that divisions of ownership are consequential: co-owned facilities, on average, emit 
approximately 74% more hazardous byproducts than do their single-owned peers.  
2.1 THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
I define a joint-venture as a common legal organization where two or more firms pool a 
portion of their resources (Kogut, 1988) to produce some product or service that collaboration 
makes more lucrative (Das & Teng, 2000). I adopt Dhanaraj & Beamish’s (2004) more 
conservative definition of an equity JV, namely a JV where at least one minority partner holds a 
minimum of twenty percent equity, to provide added assurance that at least two partners are 
actively participating in the venture.    
JVs tend to be highly customized (Turowski, 2005), but one characteristic that 
distinguishes JVs from their independent peers is the transaction costs associated with shared 
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ownership. The JV literature examines transaction costs from two distinct vantage points. The 
first examines the JV organizational form as a mechanism for corporations to reduce transaction 
costs by building economies of scale (Dyer, 1997; Hennart, 1988), overcoming knowledge 
asymmetries (Inkpen, 2000; Chi & McGuire, 1996), gaining entry into new markets (Delios & 
Beamish, 1999; Makino & Neupert, 2000; Beamish & Banks, 1987), and subjugating 
opportunism (Crook et al., 2013; Williamson, 1991). The second examines the increased 
transaction costs associated with owners bridging differences and making decisions within the 
JV organizational form (Pearce, 1997). I extend this second account from economic 
considerations to environmental outcomes. 
I argue that coordinating social investments generally, and environmental investments 
more specifically, is more challenging for JVs, because each owner has to incur immediate costs 
for distant and uncertain shared future benefits (Slawinski, 2010; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001; Hart 
& Ahuja, 1996; Elkington, 1988). Investing in projects with immediate costs and ambiguous and 
uncertain returns could prove especially problematic for co-owners mindful of proportionally 
allocating costs and benefits (Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989; Demsetz, 1967) because of the 
increased likelihood of cost and benefit spillovers. Even when partners are willing to discuss the 
allocation itself, their attempt to establish criteria for proportional contributions and gains 
significantly and often suddenly magnifies coordination costs. Although co-owners can discuss 
and agree on precautionary or protective measures, they will struggle to track costs over the 
long-term and/or to protect benefits they cannot readily observe.   
2.2 JVs and Hazardous Waste Volume 
The sustainability literature recognizes that hazardous byproducts are a combined 
function of production; pollution prevention, which attempts to remove hazardous byproducts 
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from the production lifecycle; and pollution mitigation,
2
 which attempts to safely dispose of 
hazardous waste once it occurs (King & Shaver, 2001; Klassen & Whybark, 1999). Pollution 
prevention refers to any proactive measures that integrate environmental concerns into product 
design and process technologies and that subsequently influence the types of pollutants emitted, 
the hazardous byproducts generated, and the energy consumed in the production process 
(Klassen, 2002; Judge & Douglas, 1998). Pollution mitigation, in contrast, refers to the recycling 
and treatment of hazardous waste prior to disposal. 
JVs could produce greater volumes of hazardous waste because they forego pollution 
prevention measures that eliminate hazardous waste before it occurs (King & Lenox, 2002).
3
 The 
benefits of pollution prevention are oftentimes unobservable (King & Lenox, 2002; Klassen & 
Whybark, 1999; Hart & Ahuja, 1996) and incalculable (Elkington, 1998). Even when JVs can 
foresee environmental benefits, attaining them takes time and money: pollution prevention 
requires a long-term (Arora & Cason, 1995), sustained (Hirschhorn, 1994) commitment of 
resources, while its positive yet uncertain effects accrue in the distant future (Slawinski, 2010).   
Investing in projects with immediate costs and ambiguous and uncertain returns (Sarkis 
& Cordeiro, 2001; Hart & Ahuja, 1996) appears especially problematic for co-owners mindful of 
proportionally allocating costs and benefits (Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989; Demsetz, 1967) 
because of the increased likelihood of cost and benefit spillovers. This makes it more likely for 
                                                          
2
 Some sustainability scholars use the term pollution control rather than pollution mitigation to refer to end-of-pipe 
measures such as the recycling and treatment of hazardous waste. However, the public policy literature uses the term 
pollution control to refer to legal and regulatory requirements (Lin & Darnall, 2010) for pollution abatement. I use 
the term pollution mitigation to avoid any misunderstandings surrounding the definition of pollution control. 
3
 JVs could also differ in hazardous emissions and pollution mitigation due to larger production volumes, since those 
facilities that produce more typically create more hazardous byproducts (Harrison & Antweiler, 2003; Antweiler & 
Harrison, 2003). JV scholars have long-emphasized economies of scale as one of the primary motivations for joint-
venturing (Shapiro & Willig, 1990; Kogut, 1988; Hennart, 1988; Contractor & Lorange, 1988).  
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one or more of the partners to decline or delay needed investments, which unevens the cost-
benefit calculations and adds further coordination challenges to all the JV partners. Even when 
co-owners can discuss and agree on precautionary or protective measures, they will struggle to 
track costs over the long-term and/or to protect benefits they cannot readily observe.   
I therefore predict that joint-venture facilities produce more hazardous byproducts than 
do their single-owned peers, because divided ownership makes it more difficult (costly and 
complex) to agree upon and implement pollution prevention measures. 
Hypothesis 1: JV facilities produce more hazardous byproducts than do single-owned 
facilities. 
2.3 Environmental Trade-offs 
Divided ownership may constitute an influencing factor in the way facilities deal with the 
hazardous products of their activities. The classic trade-off set-up in the sustainability literature 
is economic: because emitting is cheaper and mitigation is more expensive, managers that focus 
upon profit-maximization will opt for more emissions and/or less mitigation. This trade-off may 
be sharper for JVs for a couple reasons. First, JVs have a clear economic value-creation mandate 
(Killing, 1983), which increases the saliency of costs and benefits for all owners, directing 
attention to economic considerations (Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989). Second, when facilities have 
multiple owners, their different calculations of costs and benefits re-activate economic 
considerations on an ongoing basis (Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1989). 
But some owners also make environmental trade-offs: they compare the environmental 
pains and gains of different ways of dealing with hazardous byproducts (Sarkis & Cordeiro, 
2001; El-Halwagi, 1997). Emitting comes with serious environmental consequences, which can 
be costly for owners – but not necessarily equally costly for all owners. When there are multiple 
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owners, these pains may be diluted or diverted to a different partner. Pollution mitigation 
provides some environmental gains, but these too may be unevenly diffused and distributed 
among multiple partners. Environmental trade-offs may be less influential for JVs compared to 
their single-owned peers because divided corporate ownership disassociates pains and gains 
through delegating operational and executive control, ex-ante guidelines, and/or routines that 
constrain even the best-intended co-owners from considering environmental concerns (Pearce, 
1997).  
Across facilities, social scrutiny can also motivate the reduction of emissions and/or 
greater mitigation. Social scholars suggest that public scrutiny provides incentives for favouring 
pollution mitigation over emissions (Langpap, 2007; Lynch-Wood & Williamson, 2007). For 
example, the appearance of doing good builds goodwill that subsequently establishes 
commitment to a company’s stock and products (Margolis et al., 2007). On the other hand, firms 
that violate the public’s expectations can bring about swift recourse in the form of reputational 
damage, decreased sales, and progressively stringent regulation (Gunningham, Kagan, & 
Thornton, 2004).  
I argue that the effectiveness of social scrutiny is diminished when multiple owners are 
involved, because the effectiveness of social pressures will be diluted when multiple owners are 
involved. An independent owner has complete control over the operations of a facility and 
therefore presumably has direct responsibility for its emission and mitigation of hazardous 
byproducts. Attribution theory suggests that assigning responsibility for good or bad outcomes is 
relatively easy in cases of single ownership (Teigen & Brun, 2011; Shaver, 1996), but external 
observers struggle to assign accolades or blame to multiple causal agents (Teigen & Brun, 2011; 
Sanders & Hamilton, 1997; Shaver, 1996) embedded within complex organizations (Gailey & 
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Lee, 2005; Sanders & Hamilton, 1997). To hold individual JV owners accountable, observers 
must disentangle the JV’s ownership structure to determine who is responsible, and in what 
proportion, within the embedded principal-agent relationships of a JV.  
I therefore predict that, compared to their independently owned peers, co-owned facilities 
will emit more and mitigate less hazardous byproducts.   
Hypothesis 2A: JV facilities emit more hazardous byproducts than do single-owned 
facilities. 
Hypothesis 2B: JV facilities mitigate less hazardous byproducts than do single-owned 
facilities. 
2.4 Legal Considerations 
Facility owners are not always free to choose the way they deal with hazardous 
byproducts, even if they bypass public scrutiny when considering environmental trade-offs. 
Laws and regulations constrain corporate behaviour by setting limits on emissions; they create 
and enforce expectations by providing legal demands to work within these constraints and legal 
recourse against firms who ignore them.  
However, laws and regulations are not always effective at influencing pollution 
abatement. Many claim that existing laws and regulations fail to provide enough incentive to 
encourage environmentally responsible behaviour (Gunningham et al., 2004). Some argue that 
the costs of compliance exceed the costs of non-compliance (Lanoie, Laplante, & Roy, 1997; 
Russell, 1990), and environmental agencies oftentimes lack the resources for effective 
enforcement (Russell, 1990). I argue that divided ownership will influence the effectiveness of 
specific laws and regulations on the emissions and mitigation of hazardous byproducts. I explore 
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this argument using the legal liability regimes which predetermine the allocation of 
environmental pains, or legal liability, when multiple partners are involved.  
Legal liability regimes that govern business within a political jurisdiction define firms’ 
potential liability in cases of environmental harm. In cases of divided ownership, the liability of 
the partners does not necessarily reflect their ownership shares (Wright, 1988). Typically, 
plaintiffs hold the joint-venture liable for its own actions, and penalties are allocated 
proportionally to corporate owners. However, in cases of insolvency, undercapitalization, or 
negligence, different jurisdictions specify how strictly property rights assignments are externally 
enforced (Grady, 1990). Some Canadian provinces restrict potential liabilities on a basis of 
proportional responsibility, while others disconnect ex-ante responsibilities from ex-post 
penalties for wrongdoing. 
Joint-and-several liability regimes treat defendant firms more harshly (Kornhauser & 
Revesz, 2009; Kornhauser & Revesz, 1994) and provide victims with certain added protections 
against wrongdoing (Dopuch, Ingberman & King, 1997); plaintiffs can hold any solvent partner 
fully liable for damages incurred (Kornhauser & Revesz, 2009; Vandall, 2000; Wright, 1988). 
Businesses frequently complain, however, that joint-and-several liability encourages 
unmeritorious lawsuits (Palmrose, 1994-1995: 54). These regimes likely encourage additional 
preventative care because JV partners increasingly seek to find shared priorities, and, as 
enforcement increases, to act on these priorities so they can anticipate and mitigate penalties 
disproportionate to the bundles they own (Grady, 1990). 
Proportional liability regimes, in contrast, appear to provide fewer incentives for 
addressing hazardous externalities in cases of divided ownership. Proportional liability provides 
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JV partners with added protections by limiting their liability to the proportion of their 
responsibility for wrongdoings (Kornhauser & Revesz, 2009; AAMDC, 2010). In these regimes, 
plaintiffs must individually sue each potentially culpable party to recover full damages, thus 
increasing plaintiffs’ costs, discouraging lawsuits, and preventing disproportional penalties. 
Co-owners in stricter liability regimes share a common interest in mitigating potential 
disproportionate liabilities. I therefore expect that JV facilities in stricter liability regimes will 
emit less and mitigate more hazardous waste than will all other facilities. 
Hypothesis 3A: JV facilities in joint-and-several liability regimes emit less hazardous 
byproducts than do all other facilities. 
Hypothesis 3B: JV facilities in joint-and-several liability regimes mitigate more 
hazardous byproducts than do all other facilities.   
2.5 Categories of Harm 
People agree that corporate actions should not harm bystanders (van de Ven & Jeurissen, 
2005; Gunningham et al., 2004), and Donaldson & Dunfee (2000) point to a significant and 
growing global consensus around the moral authority of such transcultural norms. Consistent 
with the precepts of major religions and philosophies, global industry and professional standards, 
and the laws of multiple countries (Dunfee, 2006), these “hyper-norms,” which emphasize the 
avoidance of harm, drive managerial behaviour and sometimes substitute for the absence or 
ineffectiveness of laws and regulations (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994: 265). Thus, perceptions of 
harm should influence the relationship between divided ownership and the choices facilities 
make to address their hazardous byproducts.  
Classifications of harm represent one characteristic of hazardous byproducts that 
influences these perceptions. Federal and non-profit organizations classify chemicals according 
to the numerous dimensions that capture their hazardous impacts on humans and the natural 
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environment. Cancerous and non-cancerous human health impact classifications are fairly 
common across scales (Toffel & Marshall, 2004; Bare et al., 2003; McKone & Hertwich, 2001). 
Classifying chemicals in this manner shapes the way people think about hazardous emissions 
(Slovic, 1996). Such classifications not only stigmatize unambiguous harm (Berman & 
Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989) but can also mislead some to believe that ambiguous harm is 
less problematic. For example, some may consider the impacts of ‘non-cancerous’ chemicals as 
somehow more manageable and/or less undesirable than those of ‘cancerous’ chemicals, 
although exposure to non-cancerous emissions has deleterious effects, such as high rates of 
chronic and acute respiratory illnesses, increased morbidity, and decreased life expectancy (Bare 
et al., 2003). 
The perceived undesirability of harm influences the likelihood that social observers will 
blame and sanction organizations for wrongdoing (Lang & Washburn, 2012). The more severe 
the perceived undesirability, the more likely such questionable behaviour will trigger feelings of 
suffering, unfairness, and violations of in-group and out-group boundaries (Appiah, 2009). 
Because all owners should see and agree that cancerous emissions are harmful, they have similar 
inherent and external incentives to avoid such unambiguous harm. Thus, I do not expect that co-
ownership contributes to differences in the emission or mitigation of cancerous chemicals.  
Hypothesis 4: For cancerous byproducts, there is no difference between JV and single 
owned facilities in a) emissions and b) mitigation. 
 
Conversely, I hypothesize that ambiguous categories such as “non-cancerous” chemicals 
leave room for interpretation, both among stakeholders and among owners. In such cases, JVs 
may downplay environmental considerations and prioritize the economic trade-offs discussed 
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above, emitting more and mitigating less of their non-cancerous hazardous byproducts than their 
independently owned peers.  
Hypothesis 5: For non-cancerous hazardous byproducts, JV facilities a) emit more and 
b) mitigate less than single-owned facilities. 
2.6 METHODS 
2.6.1 Data and Sample 
I examine the relationship between divided ownership, hazardous emissions, and 
pollution mitigation by examining Canada’s legislated inventory of pollutant releases, named the 
National Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI). Under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
(CEPA 1999), Environment Canada is charged with collecting, compiling, and insuring the 
accuracy of self-reported pollution data for over 8800 facilities exceeding chemical release 
thresholds for at least one of over 300 tracked substances (Environment Canada, 2013a). 
Environment Canada randomly conducts on-site visits to verify reported data, and if these audits 
identify any inaccuracies, firms are legally obliged to correct their reports (Environment Canada, 
2013b). 
Reporting to the NPRI is mandatory under Canadian law, however, the NPRI does not 
track all hazardous substances, and some facility sectors remain exempt from reporting 
requirements. Federal law also provides exemptions for all facilities utilizing fewer than 20,000 
annual man hours, the equivalent of 10 full-time employees, which prevents examining data for 
the smallest Canadian facilities. A sector by sector analysis indicates that the percentage of 
reporting facilities varies for the highest polluting industries (from 36 to 97%), due to these 
exemptions, but NPRI coverage and compliance has increased substantially over time 
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Environment Canada periodically adds new chemicals to the reporting requirements,
5
 
updates reporting and auditing procedures, and changes chemical report thresholds (Environment 
Canada, 2013d, 2012). I included the last five years of publicly available data at the initiation of 
the study (2004–2009), since changes to the NPRI reporting program and estimation procedures 
make it difficult to clearly compare more recent data to earlier periods.
 6
 I verified the continuity 
of reports across the five years,
7
 and the data appeared robust to potential reporting errors of 
omission and commission, which affected less than one percent of the sample over the five-year 
period. I corrected four obvious data-entry errors for facility size
8
 but made no further alterations 
to the original data. 
2.6.2 Empirical approach 
I leveraged a quasi-experimental propensity score matched-pair design to empirically test 
how divided ownership influences facility-level environmental performance. JV and independent 
facilities differ on many characteristics, and any of these differences may introduce bias into 
estimates. Randomizing facilities into treatment and control groups would overcome this 
                                                          
4
 A list of industries included in this analysis is provided in Appendix B. 
5
 This study only observes chemicals that were tracked by Environment Canada as of 2004. A complete list of 
chemicals observed in this study is provided in Appendix A. 
6
 2009 represented the last year of publically available data at the initiation of this study. 
7
 I reviewed entries year by year to flag and document any potential inconsistencies or disparities. I flagged 
observations 1) where a facility consistently filed reports for four contiguous years and failed to provide a report in 
one of the years in my sampling frame, 2) where a facility failed to report a chemical one year while consistently 
reporting the chemical in previous and future years, 3) when a facility report on a specified chemical exceeded a 
500% annual difference without being part of an apparent upward or downward trend for the facility’s use of that 
chemical, and 4) where someone obviously made a data-entry error on the fields observed in this study.   
8
 None of the corrected records was chosen as a match by the propensity score matching algorithm used in this 
study. 
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challenge, but randomization is practically infeasible with observational data. Propensity score 
matching (PSM) provides a feasible alternative to empirically singling out the effect of 
ownership by maximizing comparability between treatment and control groups (Villalonga, 
2004). PSM allows causal inference (Rosenbaum & Ruben, 1983) and yields unbiased estimates 
in the absence of experimentation (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002) by pairing each co-owned facility 
with an independently owned peer that is closely aligned on observable internal and external 
characteristics.   
Specifically, PSM uses a vector of the observable relevant differences to maximize the 
comparability between two facilities in all respects except the predictor of interest. By comparing 
facilities that closely resemble each other on all other observables, PSM effectively deals with 
sample-selection bias on the predictor variable (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1998). In other 
words, this approach ensures comparability of facilities that differ in ownership. This aspect is 
important in general because ownership is a choice that occurs early in the life of the firm and 
changes infrequently over time. Therefore, the same facility’s environmental performance cannot 
typically be observed before and after a switch in ownership structure. The PSM approach 
requires the inclusion of all relevant characteristics and assumes that any remaining unobserved 
differences occur due to random chance, leaving open the possibility of selection bias on non-
observed characteristics. 
I defined an equity JV as any co-owned facility where the second largest corporate parent 
holds at least 20% ownership (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004), which provided a sample of 85 JV 
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facilities
9
 that had filed 303 hazardous waste processing reports to the NPRI between 2004 and 
2009. Table 1 provides a detailed description of the ownership configurations within these JVs 
using Blodgett’s (1992) topology of JV ownership. I then used a PSM algorithm (Leuven & 
Sianesi, 2003) to identify the nearest-neighbour independently owned facility for each co-owned 
facility. I used matching with replacement to maximize comparability between treatment and 
control observations, minimize selection biases for observable characteristics (Dehejia & Wahba, 
2002), and avoid additional bias stemming from the order in which treatment units were matched 
(Rosenbaum, 1995). Although matching with replacement can reduce the precision of estimates, 
it is preferable in cases when there are few observable differences and when the number of close 
matches remains questionable (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002).  
 
Table 1: JV facility-year observations under different configurations of ownership 














 2 3 4 5-6 
Majority-Minority (32) 49 23 1 16 
Slightly Unequal (14) 53 3 0 0 
Dual Ownership (28) 103 0 0 0 
Minority-Minority (11) 0 17 9 18 
              * The number of JV facilities per ownership category is provided in parentheses 
 
Scholars emphasize that including variables that are weakly related to treatment 
assignment typically reduces bias more than it increases variance, and, therefore, most believe 
that all available controls should be included in matching algorithms (Rubin & Thomas, 1996; 
Heckman et al., 1998), especially when the number of control observations vastly exceeds the 
number of treatment observations (Ho et al., 2007), as in my data. Based on theoretical rationale 
explained in greater detail below, I used all available, relevant, and observable characteristics for 
                                                          
9
 I excluded one military joint venture (Canadian/U.S. SIC code 811/971), all independently owned military 
facilities, and 3 equity JVs not meeting the ownership threshold defined by Dhanaraj & Beamish (2004) for equity 
JVs. Including these facilities produced similar findings. 
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the matching algorithm:
10
 the legal jurisdiction into which each facility falls (the province where 
they are located), the three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, size (the number of 
employees per facility), scale (the number of peer facilities sharing the same federal business 
number), and impact (the number of chemicals processed by each facility).
11
 This approach 




2.6.3 Dependent variables 
I used two operationalizations for the dependent variables. I first analyzed hazardous 
emissions and pollution mitigation by weighting chemicals according to their cumulative impacts 
on human health using the Chronic Human Health Indicator (CHHI). The CHHI constitutes a 
chemical toxicity-weighting mechanism within the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
2012b) that provides different weights to chemicals based upon human exposure pathways, 
because the same chemical can have a differential impact depending upon whether it is inhaled 
or absorbed through contact or consumption (Toffel & Marshall, 2004). I then used a finer-
grained operationalization that weights chemicals with the Tool for the Reduction and 
Assessment of Chemical and other environmental Impacts (TRACI). TRACI is a newer EPA-
sponsored measure that acknowledges differences for each exposure pathway depending upon 
                                                          
10
 Many of the demographic fields in the NPRI are optional, and Environment Canada does not vet optional 
information.  Propensity score algorithms cannot consider records with missing data, so I included all observable, 
mandatory, vetted, and relevant fields in the analysis. 
11
 Production volume and financial indicators represent two unobservable factors that could introduce bias into 
estimates if JVs and independent firms systematically differ on these criteria. Prior studies on hazardous emissions 
typically used the number of employees as a rough proxy for production (Antweiler & Harrison, 2003), and JVs are 
not required to provide financial information to the public.  
12
 The mean propensity score difference between the 303 JV facility year observations and their matches was .0020 
with a standard deviation of .0078. 
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whether a given chemical has cancerous or non-cancerous human health impacts. The measure 
utilizes disability-adjusted life years to consider decreased life expectancy and the years lived 
with disability standardized by discount weights to capture unfavourable health conditions (Bare 
et al., 2003).  
I calculated hazardous byproducts with the equation 
  ∑                                  ,    (1) 
hazardous emissions with the equation 
  ∑            ,      (2) 
and pollution mitigation with the equation 
   ∑                       ,    (3) 
where   represents the total tonnage of chemical c recycled that would typically affect humans 
through exposure pathway e in year t for facility f, and   equals the hazardous weight provided 
by scale s (CHHI vs. Traci) for chemical c for exposure pathway e.   represents disposals (with 
and without treatment),  represents emissions, and τ represents the total hazardous byproducts 
disposed of after treatment.  I take the log transformations of these measures to correct for 
skewness and kurtosis. 
2.6.4 Independent variables 
I operationalized the JV indicator (JV) as 1 for joint ventures and as 0 for independent 
facilities, which allowed me to examine the effect of co-ownership on hazardous emissions and 
pollution mitigation. I operationalized the joint-and-several indicator (J&S) as 1 for joint-and-
several political jurisdictions and as 0 otherwise, because more legal stringency in the form of 
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potentially disproportionate liability may influence co-owned facilities corporate response to 
hazardous waste. The empirical setting (Canada) contains three distinct legal liability regimes 
that vary in stringency. Most Canadian firms operate under the most stringent joint-and-several 
legal liability regime. However, Saskatchewan firms operate under a pure proportional liability 
regime, while British Columbian firms operate under a hybrid joint-and-several/proportional 
liability regime. I coded both Saskatchewan and British Columbian facilities as 0, since there 
were not enough Saskatchewan observations to allow a separate analysis of that province’s less-
stringent legal liability regimes.
13
   
2.6.5 Control variables 
Since my population of interest (i.e., co-owned facilities) was stratified within the 
numerous dimensions used to match co-owned facilities with similar independently owned 
facilities, I used each matching criterion as a control within the regression equations (Ho et al., 
2007; Villalonga, 2004; Friedlander & Robins, 1995). Following prior NPRI (Harrison & 
Antweiler, 2003; Antweiler & Harrison, 2003) and TRI studies, (Berchicci et al., 2012; King & 
Lenox, 2001; King & Shaver, 2001), I used facility size (FacilitySize), operationalized by the 
number of facility employees, as a crude measure of production, because I expected larger 
facilities to pollute more. I also controlled for the number of chemicals (NumberofChemicals) 
and the volume, or raw tonnage, of hazardous waste (HazardousByproducts) reported by each 
facility because I expected facilities emitting a larger number and volume of chemicals to 
differentially anticipate (Hart, 1995), monitor (Russo & Fouts, 1997), report (Sharma & 
Vrendenburg, 1998; Shrivastava, 1995), and abate (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2011) their 
emissions.  
                                                          
13
 Excluding Saskatchewan facilities altogether does not alter the findings in the analysis. 
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I also controlled for three additional aspects of ownership that can influence 
environmental outcomes. First, approximately 23% of the facilities had at least one foreign 
owner. I controlled for the percentage of foreign ownership (ForeignOwnership) because prior 
studies argue that foreign-owned firms pollute more (King & Shaver, 2001) and may be judged 
more harshly for doing so (Lange & Washburn, 2012). Second, I controlled for the percentage of 
ownership represented by firms listed on the S&P 500 and S&P TSX Composite Index (S&P) in 
case additional visibility and/or equity market scrutiny influences environmental performance
14
 
(Lee, 2009; Villalonga, 2004). Finally, firms with multiple facilities may face stronger pressures 
for shared responsibility and/or take advantage of peer-to-peer learning in pollution prevention 
and abatement. I therefore controlled for the number of Canadian-based, NPRI-reporting peer 
facilities owned and operated by the same parent(s) (PeerFacilities).  
2.6.6 Analysis 
I used standard OLS pooled regression and clustered the error terms by facility to account 
for potential correlation in the error term attributable to the same facility reporting across time 
(Rodgers, 1993). I included year fixed-effects (Year) to account for annual trends in pollution 
abatement technologies, industry fixed-effects at the three-digit SIC level (Industry) to control 
for idiosyncratic differences that vary across industries, and provincial fixed-effects (Province) 
to account for any cultural and regulatory differences attributable to regional jurisdictions. My 
baseline regression equation was:  
                                                          
14
 The percentage of foreign ownership and the percentage of ownership listed on S&P indexes were excluded from 
the matching algorithm because independently owned facilities would either be 100% or 0% in both of these 
indicators.   
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Overall, the baseline model accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in the 
data, ranging from 40 to 63 percent depending upon the dependent variable observed. The 
independent variables accounted for up to 3.1% of the statistical significance in the model 
depending upon the dependent variable examined.
15
 As expected, context (industry and 
province) and scale (facility size, number of chemicals reported, and hazardous waste volume) 
accounted for the vast majority of variance in the data. While the models’ statistical significance 
attributable to the independent variables appears small, the more important question is whether 
the substantive significance of the findings is meaningful (Miller, 2008; Weisberg. 2004). The 
results below demonstrate that co-ownership, overall, significantly and substantially influences 
hazardous emissions and pollution mitigation for substances known to detrimentally impact 
human health. 
Correlations between the independent variables were moderate, but multicollinearity did 
not appear to affect the results. The largest variance inflation factor (VIF) for the JV predictor 
was 1.49, and the largest VIF for remaining variables was J&S at 5.66, well below the threshold 
value of 10 (Kennedy, 1997; Neter et al., 1996), indicating that multicollinearity did not affect 
the results. While all coefficients’ corresponding p-values were significant at an alpha level of 
                                                          
15
 The independent variables independent accounting for variance in the data was examined by running the models 
without control variables. 
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0.05 in the main analysis, I indicate a more liberal level of significance at an alpha of 0.1 since a 
type II error, that is the failure to reject the false null hypothesis, would fail to identify outcomes 
that potentially impact human health. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics of the matched-
pair sample along with pair-wise correlations among variables in the analysis.   
2.7 RESULTS 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the analysis. Hypothesis 1 predicted that, ceteris 
paribus, JV facilities would produce more hazardous byproducts because they struggle to align 
their collective interests to agree upon and implement pollution prevention measures that require 
long-term investments with uncertain and hard-to-allocate returns. As shown in column 1 of 
Table 3, the coefficient for the JV predictor was negative and statistically non-significant, 
indicating that co-owned facilities do not produce more hazardous byproducts than the matched 
control of single-owned facilities. I further verified that this matched control sample was 
representative of the larger population of single-owned facilities using ANOVA.16 The f-statistic 
of 1.84 (p=0.175) confirmed that the control subsample did not significantly differ from the 
population of independently owned facilities. Thus, H1 was rejected: JV facilities do not 
automatically produce more byproducts than do comparable single-owned facilities.  
Hypothesis 2A predicted that JV facilities would emit more hazardous waste compared to 
their independently owned peers, because JVs favour economic trade-offs and are less likely to 
take environmental trade-offs into consideration when deciding how to deal with their hazardous 
byproducts. The results indicated that, compared to their independent cohorts, co-owned 
                                                          
16
 Not displayed for parsimony.  I used frequency weights to account for the same independent facility observation 
serving as a match for multiple JV facility observations, and I restricted the ANOVA to those industries included in 
the match-pair sample. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
  Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Volume Haz. Byproducts 1,182,578 7,726,940 0 158,000,000  1         
2 Hazardous emissions    367,867 1,255,587 0   24,100,000 0.2207  1        
3 Mitigation      95,429    432,635 0     5,337,714 0.0664 0.0877  1       
4 Non-Cancerous Emissions    159,398    706,154 0     6,968,236 0.0980 0.2328 0.0442  1      
5 Cancerous Emissions      53.80           461 0            9,440 0.0229 0.0181 0.1673 0.0489  1     
6 Non- Cancerous Mitigation      13,587    111,301 0     1,934,868 0.0823 0.0292 0.0359 -0.0154 0.0129  1    
7 Cancerous Mitigation      42.54           420 0            4,791 0.0108 -0.0060 0.1365 0.0307 0.6370 -0.0116  1   
8 JV        0.50        0.50 0            1 0.0452 -0.0533 -0.1802 0.1086 -0.0920 -0.0009 -0.1011  1  
9 J&S        0.86        0.34 0            1 0.0054 -0.0774 0.0771 -0.2799 0.0370 0.0174 0.0401 0.0000 1 
10 Facility size           888        2,142 2          11,252 0.0731 0.1724 0.1898 -0.0180 0.2392 0.0615 0.1976 -0.2014 0.1155 
11 Peer facilities        5.39      16.43 0        121 -0.0307 -0.0131 -0.0484 -0.0340 -0.0298 -0.0274 -0.0177 -0.0382 -0.0822 
12 Foreign ownership      15.60      32.20 0        100 -0.0615 -0.0873 -0.0730 -0.0581 -0.0508 -0.0506 -0.0491 0.2319 0.0944 
13 S&P Constituency      16.29      30.96 0        100 0.0236 -0.0296 -0.0952 -0.0315 -0.0339 0.1168 -0.0532 0.2767 -0.0341 
14 Number of Chemicals      13.98      11.72 1   58 0.1759 0.2460 0.1852 0.2242 0.3318 0.1815 0.3642 -0.0833 -0.1210 
 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 
9 J&S  1      
10 Facility size 0.1118  1     
11 Peer facilities -0.0636 -0.0909  1    
12 Foreign ownership 0.0609 -0.0830 0.0091  1   
13 S&P Constituency -0.0154 -0.1066 -0.0931 -0.0421  1  
14 Number of Chemicals -0.1106 0.2235 0.0518 -0.1972 -0.0120 1 
Note:  n = 606. The minimum reported total toxic emissions exceeds zero, but rounds to zero.  Correlations (absolute value) greater than 0.0796 (0.1045) are significant 
 at the 5% (1%) level. 
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Table 3: The relationship between co-ownership and pollutants weighted by their general human health impacts 
 
       p<.001 = ****; p<.01 = ***; p<.05 = **; p<.1 = *, one-tailed 
       Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parenthesis 
       Chemicals in hypotheses 1 to 3 are weighted using the Chronic Human Health Indicator 
 





Emissions Emissions Mitigation Mitigation Emissions Mitigation 
 
JV   - 1.2291     0.5544 ***   - 0.9240    -0.6014  - 3.5532  
    (4.6471)     (0.2901)    (1.7547)    (1.0286)  (3.7094)  
                 JV*J&S                1.4007  - 3.0438  
               (1.0920)  (7.2197)  
                 J&S   3.2241     3.1718  1.9481 ** 1.9713 *** - 1.5904  - 1.6291     1.3494    3.1862  
 (11.2731)  (11.3192)  (1.1570)  (1.1108)   (7.1841)  (7.1133)    (1.1844)  (4.0871)  
                 Ln(Facility Size)    7.1286 ****    7.1060 ****  0.5805 ****   0.4875 ****  2.2617 *** 2.2460 ***    0.5952 **** 2.2581 *** 
   (1.8921)   (1.9129)  (0.1039)  (0.1627)  (0.9014)  (0.8849)    (0.0965)  (0.8911)  
                 Ln(Peer Facilities)    2.1536     2.0613   0.4461 ***   0.4875 ***   0.1019    0.0329     0.5087 ***   0.0810  
   (2.3725)   (2.3351)  (0.1725)   (0.1627)  (1.1262)  (1.1243)    (0.1680)  (1.0737)  
                 Ln(Foreign Ownership)    0.1564    0.1752   0.0041  - 0.0044    0.0923    0.1065    -0.0078   0.0986  
   (0.2662)   (0.2812)  (0.0162)   (0.0163)   (0.0854)   (0.0854)    (0.0160)   (0.0877)  
                 Ln(S&P Constituent)  - 0.0315   - 0.0256   0.0054    0.0027  - 0.0220  - 0.0175     0.0014  - 0.0204  
   (0.1060)    (0.1041)  (0.0049)  (0.0048)   (0.0307)   (0.0295)    (0.0048)  (0.0294)  
                 Ln(No. Chemicals) 17.9299 ****  17.8468 ****  1.7357 ****   1.7711 ****   3.2728 ***   3.2138 ***    1.7547 **** 3.1765 *** 
 (4.8048)    (4.7838)  (0.2702)  (0.2592)   (1.3789)  (1.3945)    (0.2603)  (1.3953)  
                 Ln(Haz. Byproducts)     0.0214 **** 0.0215 ***   0.0058    0.0056     0.0211 **** 0.0046  
     (0.0044)  (0.0043)   (0.0220)   (0.0220)    (0.0043)  (0.0223)  
                 Province Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
                 
Adjusted    0.5111  0.5103  0.7319  0.7347  0.4898  0.4896  0.7369  0.4896  
Δ      0.0008    0.0028    0.0002  0.0050  0.0002  
Facilities 249  249  249  249  249  249  249  249  
n 606  606  606  606  606  606  606  606  
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facilities emit approximately 74% more hazardous emissions,
17
 lending support for hypothesis 
2A. Net of the volume of hazardous waste resulting from each facility’s production process 
(H1),co-ownership was shown to have significant and substantial effects on facilities’ emissions.  
Counter to Hypothesis 2B, I found no evidence that JVs and independently owned 
facilities differ in hazardous byproducts mitigation. While the coefficient for JV facilities is large 
and negative, it is statistically non-significant. This result was somewhat surprising in light of 
JVs’ hazardous emissions. I considered the possibility that JVs mitigate similar amounts of 
hazardous waste because recycling and treatment technologies may not exist for some chemical 
byproducts, since King & Shaver (2001) suggest that foreign-owned facilities may produce 
unique and unfamiliar chemical compounds that prevent mitigation. Unlike King & Shaver, 
however, I found no evidence of a relationship between foreignness and hazardous waste 
processing,
18
 and every chemical reported by facilities in the sample had been recycled or treated 
by firms prior to 2003. Thus, all emitted chemicals in the sample could have been treated or 
recycled, but facilities chose to emit nonetheless.   
One potential explanation for this non-finding is that most facilities – JVs and 
independent alike – appeared to do little in terms of pollution mitigation. Over the six-year 
sample, facilities treated or recycled only 12.64% of all hazardous waste that could have been 
treated or recycled.
19
 Perhaps facilities minimize pollution mitigation to the bare minimum 
allowed by laws or regulation. An alternative explanation is that all facilities employ at least 
                                                          
17
 The percentage difference for JV facilities is determined by examining the exponentiated coefficient of the JV 
indicator variable: exp(      =  exp(0.5544) – 1 = 1.74 
18
 King & Shaver (2001) did not examine JV facilities in their study, and they weighted chemical hazards by an 
older method that is no longer utilized (i.e. the inverse of reportable quantity threshold), providing two potential 
explanations for the different findings. 
19
 Based upon hazardous waste reported to the NPRI by all facilities, prior to weighting the level of hazard. 
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some half-hearted pollution mitigation measures, perhaps to signal a requisite degree of concern 
for environmental externalities.  
In hypotheses 3A and 3B, I predicted that, compared to all other  facilities, co-owned 
facilities in pure joint-and-several regimes would emit less and mitigate more hazardous waste 
since stricter liability regimes increase the enforceability of social expectations through 
potentially disproportionate penalties. Counter to my predictions, I found no evidence that JV 
facilities in stricter liability regimes differ from other facilities in hazardous emissions or 
pollution mitigation; I therefore reject hypotheses 3A and 3B. 
One potential explanation for these results might be that they stem from unobservable 
cultural differences within political jurisdictions in the sample. Eighty-seven percent of my 
observations for non-joint-and-several regimes derived from British Columbia, where 
environmental landscapes represent a great source of pride and concern for the region’s 
population (Willems-Braun, 1997). This heightened awareness of environmental issues could 
influence decision-makers embedded within the regional culture and provide additional 
incentives for facilities to address environmental externalities, thus eliminating the legal liability 
influence that would typically be observed. 
Another potential explanation is that disproportionate liability manifests only in cases of 
undercapitalization, insolvency, or negligence (Grady, 1990). It is possible that co-owners of 
struggling or undercapitalized JVs in stricter regimes pay closer attention to environmental 
externalities or that co-ownership reduces the likelihood of negligent emissions. However, the 
data cannot differentiate facilities along these dimensions. The self-reported (and sometimes 
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audited) and publicly available government information simply speaks to more typical decisions 
and behaviours
20
 that may not activate the legal liability regime. 
As shown in Table 4, I next examined the extent to which co-owners attend to cancerous 
byproducts (H4A and H4B) and neglect non-cancerous byproducts (H5A and H5B). Supporting 
null-hypotheses 4A and 4B, I found no difference between JV and independent firms in their 
emissions and mitigation of cancerous byproducts. JV and independently owned facilities emit 
(H4A) and mitigate (H4B) similar amounts of cancerous waste. A power analysis, including a 
sample size of 606, a minimum observed   of 0.3979, 58 predictors, and a type-one error rate of 
.001, revealed that hypotheses 4A and 4B provided a statistical power equal to one, indicating 
that there was more than sufficient statistical power to support these null hypotheses. In support 
of hypothesis 5A, I found that co-owned facilities emitted approximately 158% more non-
cancerous hazardous waste. However, I found no evidence that they mitigate less non-cancerous 
waste, which led me to reject hypothesis 5B.  
While I expected co-owned facilities to emit more non-cancerous byproducts, I was 
surprised to discover how much more co-owned facilities emit. I therefore ran a robustness check 
to ensure that the statistical significance and magnitude of the results remained robust to the 
weighting mechanism used to capture cancerous and non- cancerous externalities. I replaced 
TRACI’s weighting mechanism with the Environmental Defense Funds Toxicity Equivalent 
Potential Scorecard (TEPS), Environment Canada’s preferred hazardous weighting mechanism.
                                                          
20
 I assume that a large majority of emissions in the data fell within acceptable thresholds established by existing 
laws and regulations since firms provide self-reported emissions data to the government and general public. 
Page 36 of 121 
Table 4: The relationship between co-ownership and pollutants weighted by their cancerous and non-cancerous human health impacts 
  Hypothesis 4A  Hypothesis 4B  Hypothesis 5A  Hypothesis 5B 




















JV   - 0.1780    - 0.8702     0.9497 ***   - 0.1714  
     (0.2157)    (0.8987)     (0.4640)     (1.4775)   
                 J&S   0.6597     0.6536  - 3.7137 * - 3.7435 * - 1.2695  - 1.2286  - 1.6794  - 1.6868  
  (0.7753)    (0.7925)   (2.6475)  (2.5629)   (1.2772)   (1.2676)   (6.6239)   (6.6191)  
                 Ln(Facility Size)   0.3799 ****  0.3770 ****   1.4719 ***   1.4574 ***  0.0925    0.1107     1.7082 ***   1.7049 *** 
  (0.0850)    (0.0834)   (0.5105)   (0.4919)   (0.2532)  (0.2522)   (0.6771)   (0.6742)  
                 Ln(Peer Facilities) - 0.0855  - 0.0983    0.6942    0.6314    0.4225 * 0.4939 *** - 0.0492  0.0364  
  (0.1232)  (0.1321)   (0.7196)   (0.6992)   (0.2704)  (0.2637)    (0.8710)  (0.8814)  
                 Ln(Foreign Ownership) - 0.0132 * - 0.0104  - 0.0369  - 0.0235    0.0155 *   0.0011   0.0829 **   0.0855  
  (0.0084)   (0.0086)   (0.0486)  (0.0497)   (0.0187)   (0.0209)   (0.0685)   (0.0718)  
                 S&P Constituent   0.0014  0.0022  - 0.0325 ** - 0.0283 *** 0.0084    0.0037  - 0.0139  - 0.0131  
  (0.0030)  (0.0031)   (0.0145)  (0.0144)  (0.0100)   (0.0090)   (0.0273)   (0.0252)  
                 Ln(No. Chemicals)   0.6119 ****   0.5996 ****   1.3457 *  1.2856 *   2.8842 ****   2.9510 ****   4.3769 ****   4.3648 **** 
  (0.1684)  (0.1709)   (0.8470)  (0.8601)  (0.3873)  (0.3775)   (1.1344)   (1.1532)  
                 ln(Cancerous Byproducts) 0.0188 **** 0.0186 ***   0.0245   0.0234          
 (0.0058)  (0.0058)   (0.0267)  (0.0265)          
                 
                 ln(Non-cancerous Byproducts)           0.0470  0.0465 ****  0.0190  0.0191  
         (0.0109)  (0.2637)   (0.0312)  (0.0309)  
                 
Province Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
                 
Adjusted    0.5583  0.5595  0.3979  0.3993  0.5978  0.6045  0.4800  0.4791  
Δ      0.0012    0.0014    0.0067    0.0009  
Facilities 249  249  249  249  249  249  249  249  
n 606  606  606  606  606  606  606  606  
 
p<.001 = ****; p<.01 = ***; p<.05 = **; p<.1 = *, one-tailed 
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parenthesis 
Chemicals in hypotheses 4 and 5 are weighted using the Tool for the Reduction and Assessment of Chemical and other environmental Impacts (TRACI) 
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The TEPS, like TRACI, provides hazardous weights for chemicals based upon lifecycles 
assessments and exposure pathways and provides separate weights for cancerous and non-
cancerous impacts.
21
 Using the TEPS weights provided by Environment Canada, I reweighted 
chemical hazards and reran the regressions for hypotheses 4 and 5. The TEPS weighted sample 
and robustness regressions in Table 5 replicate the main findings and indicate that JV facilities 
emit approximately 134% more non-cancerous substances (H5A), emit similar amounts of 
cancerous byproducts (H4A), and mitigate a similar amount of their cancerous (H4B) and non-
cancerous (H5B) byproducts. 
In summary, the results of the analysis showed that divided ownership contributes to 
negative externalities that have an impact on human health. A summary of hypothesized effects 
along with the analysis findings is provided in Table 6. The results reinforce the assertion that we 
are not merely witnessing a difference between two sets of facilities but rather a systematic way 
in which co-owned facilities emit more. Clearly, multiple owners can agree and act jointly just as 
effectively as single owners do to mitigate the unambiguous harm attributable to cancerous 
chemicals. At the same time, co-ownership systematically desensitizes facilities to legal liability 
regimes, environmental trade-offs, and ambiguous environmental categories such as non-
cancerous chemicals. Differentiating between cancerous and non-cancerous impacts allowed me 
to uncover variance between JV and independent facilities that could not have otherwise been 
explained. This differentiation also allowed me to distinguish among different mechanisms 
through which co-ownership may systematically hinder environmental performance.  
  
                                                          
21
 While TEPs and TRACI examine a similar number of chemicals (356 vs. 345), TEPs examines 19 chemicals not 
listed in TRACI and TRACI examines 30 chemicals not listed in TEPs, providing an overlap of 86.9%.     
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Table 5: Robustness checks examining co-ownership and cancerous and non-cancerous human health impacts 
  Hypothesis 4A  Hypothesis 4B  Hypothesis 5A  Hypothesis 5B 




















JV   - 0.1780    - 0.8702     0.9497 ***   - 0.1714  
     (0.2157)    (0.8987)     (0.4640)     (1.4775)   
                 J&S   0.6597     0.6536  - 3.7137 * - 3.7435 * - 1.2695  - 1.2286  - 1.6794  - 1.6868  
  (0.7753)    (0.7925)   (2.6475)  (2.5629)   (1.2772)   (1.2676)   (6.6239)   (6.6191)  
                 Ln(Facility Size)   0.3799 ****  0.3770 ****   1.4719 ***   1.4574 ***  0.0925    0.1107     1.7082 ***   1.7049 *** 
  (0.0850)    (0.0834)   (0.5105)   (0.4919)   (0.2532)  (0.2522)   (0.6771)   (0.6742)  
                 Ln(Peer Facilities) - 0.0855  - 0.0983    0.6942    0.6314    0.4225 * 0.4939 *** - 0.0492  0.0364  
  (0.1232)  (0.1321)   (0.7196)   (0.6992)   (0.2704)  (0.2637)    (0.8710)  (0.8814)  
                 Ln(Foreign Ownership) - 0.0132 * - 0.0104  - 0.0369  - 0.0235    0.0155 *   0.0011   0.0829 **   0.0855  
  (0.0084)   (0.0086)   (0.0486)  (0.0497)   (0.0187)   (0.0209)   (0.0685)   (0.0718)  
                 S&P Constituent   0.0014  0.0022  - 0.0325 ** - 0.0283 *** 0.0084    0.0037  - 0.0139  - 0.0131  
  (0.0030)  (0.0031)   (0.0145)  (0.0144)  (0.0100)   (0.0090)   (0.0273)   (0.0252)  
                 Ln(No. Chemicals)   0.6119 ****   0.5996 ****   1.3457 *  1.2856 *   2.8842 ****   2.9510 ****   4.3769 ****   4.3648 **** 
  (0.1684)  (0.1709)   (0.8470)  (0.8601)  (0.3873)  (0.3775)   (1.1344)   (1.1532)  
                 ln(Cancerous Byproducts) 0.0188 **** 0.0186 ***   0.0245   0.0234          
 (0.0058)  (0.0058)   (0.0267)  (0.0265)          
                 
                 ln(Non-cancerous Byproducts)           0.0470  0.0465 ****  0.0190  0.0191  
         (0.0109)  (0.2637)   (0.0312)  (0.0309)  
                 
Province Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
                 
Adjusted    0.5583  0.5595  0.3979  0.3993  0.5978  0.6045  0.4800  0.4791  
Δ      0.0012    0.0014    0.0067    0.0009  
Facilities 249  249  249  249  249  249  249  249  
n 606  606  606  606  606  606  606  606  
 
p<.001 = ****; p<.01 = ***; p<.05 = **; p<.1 = *, one-tailed 
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parenthesis 
Chemicals in the robustness checks are weighted using the Toxicity Equivalent Potential Scorecard (TEPS) 
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Table 6: Summary of hypothesized effects and analysis findings 
Hypothesis Finding 
H1:    JV facilities produce more hazardous byproducts than do single-  
          owned facilities. 
Not supported 
H2A: JV facilities emit more hazardous byproducts than do single-owned 
          facilities. 
Supported 
H2B: JV facilities mitigate less hazardous byproducts than do single- 
         owned facilities. 
Not supported 
H3A: JV facilities in joint-and-several liability regimes emit less hazardous  
          byproducts than do all other facilities. 
Not supported 
H3B: JV facilities in joint-and-several regimes mitigate more hazardous  
         byproducts than do all other facilities. 
Not supported 
H4A: There is no difference between JV and single owned facilities in the   
          emission of cancerous byproducts. 
Supported 
H4B: There is no difference between JV and single owned facilities in the  
          mitigation of cancerous byproducts 
Supported 
H5A: JV facilities emit more noncancerous hazardous byproducts than  
          do single owned facilities. 
Supported 
H5B: JV facilities mitigate less noncancerous hazardous byproducts than 
          do single-owned facilities 
Not supported 
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2.8 DISCUSSION 
This study highlights the previously under-theorized role of divided ownership in 
whether and how facilities address hazardous byproducts. I argued and showed that co-owners 
can be as sensitive as single owners to consensual issues, such as preventing exposure to 
cancerous byproducts. However, in the face of ambiguous categories of harm (i.e. non-cancerous 
hazards), co-owners were shown to be predictably and systematically less responsible than single 
owners. Simply put, co-owners predictably fail to address issues of social relevance because it 
takes more effort to reconcile multiple corporate interests (Mahoney, 2005; Beamish & Inkpen, 
1995; Killing, 1983) in pursuits of the common good. 
Theoretically, this study suggests that divisions in ownership can influence how co-
owned facilities see and negotiate the interface between business and society. Co-owners can 
overcome differences in goals and co-ordination challenges to move towards the greater good, 
but they predictably and rationally choose not to. These arguments resonate with environmental 
psychology arguments and advance a multiplicity trap. Specifically, I argued and showed that the 
mere presence of multiple owners can fundamentally alter whether and how facilities address 
pressing environmental issues.    
The sustainability literature has grown beyond organizational studies that have examined 
operations and technologies. There has been sustained interest across disciplines in efforts to 
control, abate, and/or divert hazardous byproducts before they have adverse effects on human 
health (Wilson, Chia, & Ehlers, 2006; Fullerton, 2006; Burby & Strong, 1997; Johnson, 1997; 
Landrigan & Carlson, 1995; Baker & Markoff, 1986; Arbuckle et al., 1976). My findings are 
complementary to prior evidence that emphasizes the necessity and validity of internal drivers, 
even in the absence or the divergence of external inducements (Branzei et al., 2004). By 
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including ownership as an important internal driver, and by showing how resilient it can be to 
environmental trade-offs and constraints (but not categories), I add new momentum to the 
question of what else differentiates firms’ environmental performance.  
2.8.1 Limitations and future research opportunities 
There are several limitations to the study that provide opportunities for future researchers 
to build upon my findings. First, I examined only two aspects of facility level environmental 
performance – emissions and pollution mitigation. JVs can leverage the best practices of multiple 
firms, which could lead to improvements in energy consumption, product cradle-to-grave 
impacts, or natural resource utilization. Further, JVs create the opportunity for knowledge and 
technology transfers (Spender & Grant, 1996; Kogut, 1988) that could improve parent firms’ 
environmental performance in ways not observed in this study. Thus, the relationship between 
divided ownership and other dimensions of environmental performance deserves future analysis. 
 Second, the data in my study did not allow controlling for production directly, as in other 
studies examining hazardous byproducts (Berchicci et al., 2012; Berrone et al., 2010; Antweiler 
& Harrison, 2003; King & Lenox, 2001; King & Shaver, 2001). While I controlled for the 
volume of hazardous waste created in the production life-cycle, it remains possible that JV 
facilities produce differently. For example, JV partners may take extra precautions, introduce 
different technologies, or pool and transfer capabilities across different partners. Some of the 
mechanisms by which co-ownership anticipates harm could not be tested in this study, but they 
are worthy of future queries. Co-ownership can be a force for good, and new literature is 
currently addressing whether and when divisions are generative and may even tackle intractable 
environmental challenges (Branzei & Le Ber, 2013). 
Page 42 of 121 
 Third, JV scholars indicate that different divisions of equity among JV partners influence 
the balance of power between corporate owners, the extent to which partners accommodate one 
another in decision making (Blodgett, 1992; Beamish & Banks, 1987), and the stability of the JV 
itself (Reuer, Zollo, & Singh, 2002; Lee & Beamish, 1995; Beamish 1993, 1985). In JVs with 
unequal ownership, the majority parent may have more leverage to influence decisions than 
minority partners. In dual ownership JVs (50-50 equity sharing), however, extensive 
conversations and/or negotiations are often required to reach a decision (Park & Ungson, 1997). 
Thus, different configurations of JV equity ownership could influence co-owners ability to agree 
upon and implement collective action for addressing hazardous externalities within their 
facilities. 
 More research is also required to determine the exact mechanisms by which divided 
ownership influences environmental outcomes. An important premise of my theoretical 
framework is that the greater difficulty of co-ordinating multiple economic interests gets in the 
way of environmental interests. Aligning divergent interests should become increasingly difficult 
with more heterogeneous partners and more balanced equity shares. JVs with a strong majority 
owner may behave more like independent firms than like other JVs with equal, or nearly equal, 
owners. 
My inferences relied on publicly accessible data, and I presumed that owners had access 
to such data. This presumption was particularly strong when I discussed environmental 
categories such as cancerous versus non-cancerous chemicals. Owners and other publics may 
lack accurate and actionable intelligence regarding the dangers of emitted toxins. Environment 
Canada and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency provide invaluable information on 
hazardous waste processing and disposal, but I would argue that this information remains 
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uninterpretable for the common citizen. The average person can easily ascribe meaning to 
“cancer” and “non-cancer” but cannot easily differentiate the relative hazard between 
nitrosodiphenylamine, cancerous yet relatively benign, and phenyl mercaptan, non-cancerous yet 
highly toxic. Providing tools that allow the average person to ascribe accurate meaning to 
publicly available data could prove very effective in encouraging firms to address more 
hazardous externalities. Such tools may also improve owners’ ability to understand – and 
therefore their willingness to heed – warning signals. 
Finally, this study was set in a single industrialized country with a strong legal system 
that protects social interests. I suspect that the results generalize to other industrialized countries 
with similar characteristics, but exploring the influence of divided ownership on environmental 
outcomes in the absence of these institutions or in the presence of different institutions deserves 
future study. I also encourage replications of my analysis in additional countries containing joint-
and-several and proportional liability political jurisdictions to determine the extent to which the 
results generalize to different contexts. It is possible that future scholars could find relationships 
between legal liability stringency and environmental outcomes where I could not.  
2.8.2 Practical implications 
The results of the analysis provide some interesting practical implications for policy-
makers and environmental agencies. First and foremost, they show how co-ownership 
substantially increases the hazardous chemicals produced and systematically causes JV facilities 
to emit more than their single-owned peers. While these effects may be disheartening to some, an 
important silver lining emerges: alerting co-owned facilities to the differences found may inspire 
greater attention to the co-ordination challenges discussed here. Going one step further, 
implementing differential audits, or even systems of incentives and regulations that provide more 
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stringent scrutiny to co-owned facilities, may achieve important environmental improvements. 
Because co-owners can and do effectively mitigate unambiguous harm, even simple 
communication strategies that emphasize the harmful effects of specific chemicals can direct 
attention and motivate action that benefits, rather than hurts, society. 
Further, policy-makers and environmental agencies should place additional emphasis on 
regulating hazardous non-cancerous substances, an act that would decrease ambiguity and leave 
less room for debate or delay among co-owners. Tightening regulation around less-common or 
less-understood, non-cancerous hazards would complement the motivational power of informal 
societal pressures towards cancerous substances, thus reducing overall environmental hazards. 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
The key conceptual and empirical contribution of this study lies in showing how and 
explaining why divided ownership shapes the way facilities deal with hazardous byproducts. I 
find that single and multiple owners can and do address environmental externalities when 
environmental categories are unambiguous (i.e., cancerous chemicals). However, co-ownership 
significantly and substantially downplays environmental trade-offs when categories are 
ambiguous (i.e., non-cancerous chemicals). Thus, divided ownership contextualizes hazardous 
waste processing decisions and can hinder organizations’ willingness and/or ability to take 
environmental concerns into account. 
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Chapter 3: 
 JV Ownership Coalitions &  
Environmental Performance 
 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) created widespread awareness of the detrimental 
consequences of industrial waste, not only to the natural environment but also to human health. 
The last 50 years have seen marked improvements in legislation and regulation to protect the 
public from hazardous industrial byproducts, and, increasingly, firms have worked to reduce 
industrial pollution (Glicksman & Earnhart, 2007; Laplante & Rilstone, 1996; Magat & Viscusi, 
1990) through advancements in technology (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005; Shrivastava, 1995), 
processes (Porter & van der Linde, 1995), and capabilities (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2011; Russo 
& Fouts, 1997). Despite these advancements, however, firms continue to release harmful 
byproducts that have serious health consequences, and seemingly similar organizations still 
exhibit a wide and persistent variance in environmental performance.  
More recently, scholars have increasingly ascribed differences in environmental 
performance to the systematic characteristics and preferences of different types of owners. These 
studies suggest that certain types of firms are more or less likely than others to address hazardous 
externalities due to their distinctive resources (Darnall & Edwards, 2006), inherent capabilities 
(King & Shaver, 2001), influential stakeholders (Darnall, Henriguez, & Sadorsky, 2010; Lee, 
2009), and valuation of environmental performance (Berrone et al., 2010; Sethi, 2003). While 
these studies highlight when, why, and how different types of owners pursue environmental 
sustainability, relatively little is known about how co-owners, each with a unique set of 
organizational objectives, influence environmental performance within their joint venture (JV) 
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subsidiaries. In this study, I ask “Does a JV’s ownership coalition affect its environmental 
performance, and if so, how, when, and why?” 
JV scholars hold two competing hypotheses concerning the effect of multiple owners on 
traditional performance constructs. Some theorize and find an inverse relationship between the 
number of partners associated with a venture and financial performance, arguing that additional 
partners increase complexity and costs (van de Ven, 1976), create opportunities for free-riding 
(Parkhe, 1993), intensify management problems (Beamish & Schaan, 1988) and increase the 
likelihood of conflict from divergent interests (Parkhe, 1993; Cartwright & Zander, 1968). Even 
good JV owners “can and will disagree on just about anything” (Beamish & Inkpen, 1995: 27), 
but many tackle even the toughest co-ordination challenges when they set out to build additional 
economic value (Das & Teng, 2000). Others claim and show that additional owners provide JVs 
access to more resources that can increase performance (Hu & Chen, 1996) and survival (Park & 
Russo, 1996). In some cases, the costs and benefits associated with additional owners effectively 
offset one another (Beamish & Kachra, 2004).  
Much less is known about the effect of multiple owners on social and/or environmental 
performance. Both positive and negative effects are possible because co-ordination difficulties 
can create additional opportunities for social value creation (Le Ber & Branzei, 2010; Ostrum, 
2000; Ostrum, 1990), and successes can open up unprecedented opportunities to innovate and 
grow more than competitors, especially when firms face challenging issues that require multiple 
stakeholders and partners (Branzei & Le Ber, 2013). However, creating social value becomes 
complicated by the economic costs incurred ex-ante, with unpredictable economic gains accruing 
in the distant future (Slawinski, 2010; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001). Thus, when it comes to 
voluntary social or environmental investments (i.e., where costs are certain and incurred upfront 
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while economic benefits remain questionable and/or unclear), co-owners may be less inclined to 
spend resources to overcome co-ordination challenges (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; King & 
Lenox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Elkington, 1998; Arora & Cason, 1995; Hart & Ahuja, 
1996; Hirschhorn, 1994).  
Individual firms’ characteristics and internal and external constituencies (Branzei et al., 
2004; Sharma, 2000) may further increase disparities among partners, with some bearing 
disproportionately higher costs for social investments (Darnall & Edwards, 2006) and others 
ascribing or reaping higher returns for social and/or environmentally minded activities (Margolis, 
Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007). When we add the perceptual and attributional differences among 
partners (Berrone et al., 2010; Lange & Washburn, 2012; Darnall et al., 2010; Henriguez & 
Sadorsky, 1999) to the real differences in the economic costs and benefits associated with steps 
taken by each partner, the shared search and struggle for finding overlapping interests for 
socially beneficial investments is not only less likely to happen but also harder to complete or 
sustain. 
My premise is that co-ownership influences JVs’ environmental performance through 
three distinct mechanisms. First, I hypothesize that greater numbers of owners exacerbate the co-
ordination problems stemming from real and perceptual costs and benefits, and therefore 
negatively affect environmental performance. Second, I explain that heterogeneous partners can 
surface and balance heterogeneous preferences that include specific environmental issues, and 
may therefore unilaterally or disproportionately improve common environmental performance 
for these specific issues. Third, I explain that when categories of partners – that is, partners 
representing different types of ownership – (de)emphasize specific environmental issues, the 
environmental performance of a co-owned facility adjusts accordingly. 
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3.1 THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
Several theoretical accounts explain why firms undertake voluntary social investments, 
and these proclivities lie upon a continuum polarized by profit-seeking and moral duty (van de 
Ven & Jeurissen, 2005; Scalise, 2005; Cox & Hazen, 2003). While profit seeking and moral duty 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive motivations, normative accounts suggest that managers 
pursue social investments because it is the moral thing to do (Marcus & Fremeth, 2009) and 
economic accounts suggest that managers pursue social investments when they pay off 
financially (Reinhardt & Stavins, 2010; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005). Several meta-analyses 
demonstrate that firms do consider the financial implications of environmental initiatives and are 
more likely to undertake them when they “pay” (Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Reynes, 2003) or at least 
quickly break even (Reinhardt & Stavins, 2010; Margolis et al., 2007). However, whether or not 
an environmental investment pays depends upon how firms frame environmental issues and 
account for value. 
 Margolis et al. (2007) highlight two distinct mechanisms linking social performance to 
financial performance. The first mechanism views environmental initiatives as investments in a 
distinctive resource that directly affects costs and/or complements other resources to help build 
more value internally. For instance, studies suggest that environmental initiatives increase 
resource efficiency (Porter & van der Linde, 1995), reduce risks (Flanigan, 2002; Shrivastava, 
1995), eliminate hidden costs (King & Lenox, 2002), and strengthen manufacturing performance 
(Klassen & Whybark, 1999). Scholars in this theoretical domain typically suggest that firms 
pursue environmental initiatives that predictably increase firms’ profitability (Earnhardt & Lizal, 
2006; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005). 
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The second mechanism views environmental initiatives as tools for building value 
indirectly through managing relationships with external stakeholders. In other words, morally 
responsible actions can serve a firm’s self-interest, and firms can do better by doing good 
(Margolis et al., 2007). These studies suggest that environmental performance generates 
additional demand for a company’s products (Sprinkle & Maines, 2010; McWilliams, Siegel, & 
Wright, 2006), builds goodwill (Margolis et al., 2007) and lowers the costs of capital (Sharfman 
& Fernando, 2008; Aintablian, McGraw, & Roberts, 2007; Thompson & Cowton, 2004).  
   While profit-seeking theoretical accounts focus on the financial implications of socially 
beneficial investments, they intentionally overlook firms that account for value accruing outside 
the firm. Family owners, for instance, are known to derive non-economic utility from their firms’ 
moral actions (Barrone et al., 2010; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Tagiuri & Davis, 2004; Schulze et 
al., 2001; Dane et al., 1999), while government owners provide financial capital with the intent 
that value will accrue to society (Darnell & Edwards, 2006; Downs & Larkey, 1986). Firms with 
family and/or government owners also pursue profits, but, whereas profit-maximizing firms may 
restrict investments to those that will ultimately provide calculable financial returns, family-
controlled firms (Schulze et al., 2001) and government agencies (Downs & Larkey, 1986) also 
consider social investments with ambiguous financial returns that provide societal value.   
When examining social investments, JV partners must not only manage different logics 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) but also different objectives (Killing, 1983) for social value creation 
that could undermine their ability to collectively agree upon an appropriate course of action. 
Chapter 2 demonstrates that co-ownership systematically influences environmental performance, 
and prior research explains that going beyond one owner necessarily increases conflict and 
complexity (Mahoney, 2005; Parkhe, 1993; Libecap, 1989; Barzel, 1989; Beamish & Schaan, 
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1988; van de Ven, 1976; Cartwright & Zander, 1968), even in partnerships designed 
purposefully and collaboratively (Branzei & Le Ber, 2013; Grudinschi et al., 2011). Different 
owners serve distinct internal and external stakeholders (Darnall, Potoski, & Prakash, 2010; 
Darnall, Soel, & Sarkis, 2009; Branzei et al., 2004; Sharma, 2000) and differ in their 
environmental expectations, in their readiness to undertake initiatives, and in their ex-ante 
sensitivity to environmental costs and benefits (Earnhardt & Lizal, 2006). Further, they follow 
different methods to evaluate and monetize any penalties or gains that accrue from 
environmental initiatives (Margolis et al., 2003). Getting to “maybe” is hard work (Westley, 
Zimmerman, & Patton, 2006), and common ground is never a foregone conclusion (Killing, 
1983; Mahoney, 2005; Barzel, 1997; Beamish & Inkpen, 1995; Libecap, 1989).  
 Scholars also suggest that some environmental initiatives provide more internal value 
than others. I focus on JVs’ pollution mitigation of hazardous byproducts – namely, recycling 
and treatment prior to disposal – for two primary reasons. First, unlike pollution prevention 
measures that eliminate byproducts before they occur, pollution mitigation measures typically 
increase costs without providing additional strategic or financial advantage (King & Lenox, 
2002; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001; Porter & van der Linde, 1995). Thus, increased pollution 
mitigation should more closely align with a moral-duty tendencies, while refraining from 
pollution mitigation should align with a profit-maximization tendencies. In contrast, the 
motivations for pursuing or not pursuing pollution prevention, which affects emissions, remain 
unclear and could easily align with both perspectives. Second, scholars suggest that larger firms 
may inherently emit more as a result of higher production levels (Antweiler & Harrison, 2003; 
Harrison & Antweiler, 2003) and thus may have less control over emissions. However, through 
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pollution mitigation, all firms that produce hazardous waste can choose the extent to which they 
address their environmental impacts.
22
 
I examine specific distributional characteristics of co-ownership to argue that who works 
together predictably shapes JVs’ pollution mitigation. I theorize that JV co-ownership, in 
general, exposes the often-hidden tension between profit-maximizing and moral-duty tendencies, 
and I theorize and test how the balance between these tendencies shifts, depending upon 1) 
ownership dispersion – the number of JV partners and their respective balance of ownership 
within the coalition, 2) the type of firms participating in the coalition, and 3) coalition 
heterogeneity – the balance in equity between the different types of owners in the coalition.     
3.2 OWNERSHIP DISPERSION 
Ownership dispersion represents a key distributional characteristic of ownership, 
specifically, how finely the equity invested in a specific facility is spread across multiple 
partners. Co-owned facilities range from low dispersion (few partners with uneven equity stakes) 
to high dispersion (many partners with even equity shares).
23
 The mechanism by which 
ownership dispersion influences JVs is its moderation of complexity (van de Ven, 1976) and co-
ordination difficulties (Parkhe, 1993; Cartwright & Zander, 1968), which can manifest as 
conflict, decision delays, or increased costs (Barzel, 1997; Libecap, 1989; Demsetz, 1967). 
Whatever the issue, partners who differ in their priorities naturally struggle to align multiple, and 
oftentimes conflicting, goals (Killing, 1983). These coordination difficulties are likely to be 
                                                          
22
 Every chemical reported by JV facilities in my sampling frame has been reported as treated or recycled at some 
point between 1994 and 2003, thus eliminating concerns that technology may not exist to abate certain chemical 
hazards. 
23
 Drawing upon Killing’s (1983) definition of equity joint ventures for this study, , the lowest dispersion represents 
a JV with an equity distribution of 95/5, and the highest dispersion arises from an eight-partner JV with an equity 
distribution of 32/25/12/9/7/5/5/5. 
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magnified for environmental issues, which are deeply controversial (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010) 
and elicit different time perspectives (Slawinsky, 2010), different perceptual and analytical 
scales (Wood, 2012), and different organizational routines and capabilities (McKnight, 2012).   
Environmental issues are difficult to negotiate, even when partners want to move forward 
and initiate responsible collective action. Whereas many other organizational actions are 
internally focused and self-reliant, environmental issues often call for consultation and have 
implications for many more external constituencies (Hart & Sharma, 2004). Each owner’s 
decisions and actions potentially require consideration of their own multiple stakeholders 
(Berrone et al., 2010; Branzei et al., 2004), further magnifying complexity and co-ordination 
difficulties (Graicunas, 1937). Sometimes the interests of partners frequently change (Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997), and the identification of, let alone mutual commitment to, a shared interest 
becomes hard to attain and sustain (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Dhanaraj, Branzei, & 
Subramanian, 2013). Even when such commitments are fortuitously reached (Zietsma, 2002; 
MacDonald, 2010), they may be unstable and therefore require consistent support or renewed 
commitments (Hoffman, 2011).   
Ownership dispersion can create internal frictions, even when partners agree on the 
issues, understand how to address them, and express willingness to bear the costs needed to 
improve their environmental performance. The paramount concerns of who contributes, who 
benefits, and how (Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1989; Barzel, 1997) from each environmental 
investment decision amplify the challenges in aligning the partners’ objectives. One partner’s 
equity share may polarize commitment, with lower equity owners more prone to bystander 
effects (Admati, 1994) and higher equity owners withstanding the lion’s share of societal 
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pressure and bearing the brunt of irresponsibility attributions should anything go wrong (Lange 
& Washburn, 2012). 
While these arguments suggest that ownership dispersion should be inversely related to 
environmental performance, some evidence exists to show that this effect is particularly 
pronounced for ambiguous issues (Zietsma, 2002) that leave room for debate and/or contestation 
over the appropriate course of action (MacDonald, 2010). As issues become clearer and more 
legitimate, partners face fewer challenges and more incentives, often in the form of societal 
pressures, to address their negative externalities (Gunningham, Kagen, & Thornton, 2004).  
 Many hazardous byproducts are harmful but to different extents. The effects of even 
widely known harmful chemicals like DDT or asbestos are contested, and it can take decades to 
reach consensus or unambiguously classify a substance (McGuire et al., 2013; McGuire & 
Hardy, 2009). As long as ambiguity regarding a chemical’s harmfulness remains, debate and 
disagreements among multiple owners will make it more complex, difficult, and costly to reach 
consensus for abatement. Once hazardous chemicals receive a cancerous classification, however, 
harm becomes less contestable (Berman & Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989), and partners 
should face fewer challenges in agreeing upon pollution mitigation.   
In addition to clear legal penalties, market mechanisms can shift incentives by 
reallocating supply and demand (Mackey, Mackey, & Barney, 2007). What society deems 
unacceptable will further tighten the range of actions by holding up to public scrutiny those who 
fail to do the right thing right away (Lange & Washburn, 2012). Partners may be differentially 
sensitive to these external constraints, but the multiplicity of cues will guide them on a narrower 
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and clearer path, making it more likely that they will agree to take joint action to mitigate their 
cancerous externalities. 
 I therefore predict that JV facilities will remain equally mindful of addressing their 
cancerous byproducts, regardless of ownership dispersion, because these substances are 
perceived to be the most detrimental for society (Berman & Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989). 
Thus, co-owners should face fewer challenges in identifying and agreeing upon pollution 
mitigation for these substances because of the moral duty to protect the general public from 
harm. However, JV organizations will increasingly struggle to address non-cancerous 
externalities as ownership dispersion increases, because ownership dispersion dials up the 
intractability of issues, the multiplicity of stakeholders and dynamics that ensue, the cost 
associated with negotiating a common course, and the inner polarization of incentives and 
punishments. 
Hypothesis 1A: There is no relationship between ownership dispersion and pollution 
mitigation for cancerous substances. 
Hypothesis 1B: As ownership dispersion increases, co-owned facilities’ mitigation of 
non-cancerous pollutants decreases.   
3.3 TYPES OF PARTNERS 
 Over the past 10 years, several scholars have theorized that firms characterized by 
different types of ownership perceive environmental costs and benefits differently. Therefore, 
different types of partners may be more or less likely to advocate or act in environmentally 
responsible ways (Berrone et al., 2010; Darnall & Edwards, 2006; Sethi, 2003). Put differently, 
some partners find it easier than others to align their self-interest with their moral duty.  
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3.3.1 Government Effect 
Typically in western societies, the intent of government participation in industry involves 
facilitating the production and provision of goods and services that markets cannot reliably 
provide independently (Downs & Larkey, 1986). Darnall and Edwards (2006) highlighted that 
governments finance endeavours with the intent that benefits will accrue to society rather than 
solely to the enterprise. Thus, a government financier should thoughtfully consider investments 
that balance self-interest and moral duty. More importantly, having a government co-owner can 
heighten the importance of pollution mitigation by overtly or implicitly encouraging the other 
co-owners to more thoughtfully consider hazardous byproducts and their impact on society. 
Notably, some studies have argued that the effects of government ownership are 
contingent on efficiency. Since government firms are typically less efficient and less productive 
than non-government firms (Brown, Earle, & Telegdy, 2006; Megginson & Netter, 2001; 
Mascarenhas, 1989), and productive firms typically pollute less (Cui, Lapan, & Moschini, 2012; 
Holladay, 2010), governmental ownership can be associated with poorer environmental 
outcomes, especially in underdeveloped economies (Meyer & Pac, 2013; Wang & Jin, 2007).  
However, government-backed firms are more likely to internalize environmental externalities 
(Cato, 2008; Baumol & Oates, 1988), while non-government owners tend to overlook them 
(Beladi & Chao, 2006). Further, some studies suggest that government ownership typically 
improves environmental performance once industry-effects are accounted for, even in 
developing economies (Earnhart & Lizal, 2006).   
 Sharing equity with a government co-owner, who is not only a participant or financier but 
also an enforcer of laws, regulations, and societal expectations, is fairly common, especially in 
highly polluting industries (Earnhart & Lizal, 2006). While governmental co-ownership may be 
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over-represented among environmentally under-performing industries, firms partnering with 
government can signal transparency (they attract attention), accountability (they reassure critics), 
and willingness to invest in improved performance (or risk being made an example of) (Lin & 
Darnall, 2010).
24
 I therefore predict a positive correlation between the percentage of government 
ownership in a JV facility and pollution mitigation for cancerous and non-cancerous hazardous 
byproducts. 
Hypothesis 2: A higher percentage of government ownership in co-owned facilities will 
increase pollution mitigation for a) cancerous and b) non-cancerous 
byproducts. 
 
3.3.2 Private-firm Effect   
I rely on Environment Canada’s definition of private firms as those firms owned by the 
private sector yet not publicly traded, excluding sole-proprietorships, crown corporations, and 
corporate partnerships.
25
 Relatively few studies directly examine the relationship between private 
ownership, as defined, and environmental performance, but some evidence suggests that private 
firms will underperform non-private firms. Compared with their publically traded counterparts, 
private firms tend to be undercapitalized and typically have fewer slack resources (George, 2005; 
Baker, Pricer, & Ninde, 2000; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994a, 1994b) that provide 
firms greater freedom to pursue social objectives (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Private firms also 
place less emphasis on developing environmental performance measurement indicators than 
                                                          
24
 Potential partners with government will likely envisage, ex ante, the added responsibilities and scrutiny that 
accompany a government partner. Heavy polluters that already struggle to comply with environmental regulations 
may refrain from partnering with the enforcer of environmental regulations, and government may refrain from 
partnering with heavy polluters to prevent granting legitimacy to corporate partners who skirt societal expectations. 
25
 Private ownership has numerous meanings within different literatures (Perry & Rainey, 1988). Many 
sustainability scholars use the term private ownership to characterize all non-public sector (i.e., non-government) 
and non-communal (Wang & Jin, 2007) owners, but this definition of private ownership comprises multiple 
categories of firms, including JVs, family firms, sole proprietorships, and firms that are privately held yet not 
publicly traded.  Each category of private firms likely exhibits unique characteristics that could systematically 
influence environmental outcomes. 
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public firms (Henri & Journeault, 2008). Lee (2009) found that private firms emit more Benzine 
than non-private firms
26
 and attributes this finding to greater managerial autonomy and shelter 
from public scrutiny.   
However, shelter from outside pressures could provide private firms more flexibility to 
pursue socially beneficial initiatives. Agency theory scholars argue that equity markets (Schulze 
et al., 2001; Bosch, Eckerd, & Lee, 1998; Gersick et al., 1997), in general, and specifically the 
threat of hostile takeover (Walsh & Seward, 1990) prioritize profit maximization (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). Refraining from equity markets, and thus the market for corporate 
control, may grant private firms more freedom to prioritize moral duty within their JV 
subsidiaries.  
Some agency scholars further suggest that private ownership affords owner-managers too 
much freedom and thus creates its own unique agency costs. Schulze .et al. (2001), for instance, 
highlight that private firm owner-managers oftentimes lack self-control and make excessively 
altruistic decisions. In a study of family control over public firms, Berrone et al. (2004) argue 
that family owners pursue non-economic utilities that build socio-emotional wealth, such as 
perpetuating a positive family image and reputation (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005), building 
personal prestige in the community (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Dane et al., 1999; Tagiuri & 
Davis, 2004), and accumulating social capital (Arregle et al., 2007).
27
 In other words, families’ 
social identities can become intertwined with the social performance and actions of firms in 
which they hold substantial ownership (Westhead, Cowling, & Howorth, 2001; Birley, Ng, & 
Godfrey, 1999; Fletcher, 2000).  
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 It remains unclear whether Lee includes sole-proprietorships within his definition of private firms. 
27
 Berrone et al. (2010) define family ownership as five percent equity ownership in a publically traded firm. 
Page 58 of 121 
 If private owners remain more sensitive to environmental externalities and experience 
greater utility from environmental performance, then a higher percentage of private ownership 
should translate into better environmental outcomes (in my case, more pollution mitigation). As 
with all other types of owners, private firms may be more sensitive to cancerous than non-
cancerous byproducts due to the known and unambiguous harm the former can cause (Berman & 
Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989). If private owners’ unconstrained reign allows them to take 
more decisive action, as prior studies seem to suggest (Schulze et al., 2001), I also expect 
stronger and more substantive effects for the mitigation of cancerous emissions. 
Hypothesis 3: A higher percentage of private-firm ownership in co-owned facilities will 
increase pollution mitigation for a) cancerous and b) non-cancerous 
byproducts. 
 
3.3.3 Russian-Doll Effect  
In contrast to government owners who increase transparency and private owners who 
leverage transparency when following their pro-social values, facilities can also opt for equity 
contributions by other joint ventures. In such cases, a new and different configuration of second-
order partners non-additively increases the costs of agreeing upon socially beneficial 
environmental investments while simultaneously sheltering those indirect co-owners from some 
of the friction and frustration of working out a common course and from blame if such a course 
is never found. This configuration simultaneously overplays self-interest and downplays moral-
duty, making it more likely to act as a spanner in the works, dampening down collective efforts 
and/or collective efficiency at mitigating hazardous emissions.  
Effectively, such second-order JV ownership overtaxes even the best-intended decision-
makers (Mallard, 2012) and makes it more challenging to find meaningful links between the 
issues firms confront and the courses they choose (Weiner, 1995) – in this case, firms’ efforts 
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and/or efficiency at mitigating hazardous waste. Fösterling (1988) explained that this cognitive 
link becomes less likely when more steps in the logical chain of events separate the evaluated 
cause and effect, when more intertwined influences contribute to the outcome (Teigen & Brun, 
2011), and when organizations have less control over the activities that led to the outcome 
(Struthers et al.,  2004). Because a JV parent creates more distance between the parent’s 
corporate owners and the effect of the subsidiary JV’s environmental performance, a JV parent 
not only significantly thickens the ranks of influential parties working on any given issue
28
 but 
also dampens everyone’s ability to recognize and agree upon the appropriate course of action.  
So it is neither added self-interest nor the ability to hide lower moral responsibility that 
gets in the way but, rather, a default to profit-maximization that disconnects moral-duty within 
subsidiary operations from decision-making within the JV parent. This condition creates a 
Russian-doll effect whereby each additional layer of ownership further reduces a JV subsidiary’s 
ability to address hazardous externalities. This effect may be even stronger for cancerous 
chemicals, where the first-order owners may be more willing and likely to mitigate emissions in 
the first place, but they remain unable to convince a parent JV owners-in-hiding, which impose 
their own financial interests.   
Hypothesis 4: A higher percentage of joint-venture ownership in co-owned facilities 
will decrease pollution mitigation for a) cancerous and b) non-cancerous 
byproducts. 
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 The number of relationships surrounding a JV is represented by the equation  
   
 
   , where N equals the number 
of parties affiliated with the joint-venture. The number of relationships parent JV managers must consider is 
surrounding a parent equation  
   
 
     
   
 
   , where P equals the number of parties affiliated with the parent 
JV and N equals the number of parties affiliated with the subsidiary joint-venture. 
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3.4 COALITION HETEROGENEITY 
 In the previous section, I theorize that three types of owners (government, private firms 
and joint-venture equity holders) drive co-owned facilities in different directions. While 
government, private, and JV owners constitute large and often heterogeneous categories, theory 
and evidence suggest that each group may share a recognizable cognitive frame
29
 (Polleta & 
Jasper, 2001; Brickson, 2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Tyler, 1999), especially when it comes 
to the ways they might go about addressing environmental externalities (Berrone et al., 2010; 
Darnall & Edwards, 2006). For example, one would expect that government owners would 
generally push for moral-duty (i.e., more mitigation and less harm) and JV owners would 
subscribe to self-interested gains. But being pulled in different direction leaves unanswered the 
logically next question: Which direction might prevail, and when? 
Owners sharing the same frame may be quick to work through issues and converge on 
agreeable solutions (Thomas & Ely, 2009; Grey, 1989; Lax & Sebenius, 1986), but the greater 
the number of different frames, the longer and more non-linear the journey (Hoffman, 2011a, 
2011b; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). In the last decade, a large and growing literature on cross-
sector solutions to environmental issues has suggested that different frames can be bent and 
fused to unearth often unprecedented value and/or resolve intractable issues (Branzei & Le Ber, 
2013; Le Ber & Branzei, 2010; Lin & Darnall, 2010). Indeed, while frame-bending and fusion 
has its own costs, the benefits are often worthwhile. Even warring parties can overcome their 
prior biases and break substantively different new grounds (Zietsma et al., 2002; MacDonald, 
                                                          
29
 Institutional logics embody socially derived formal and informal rules that influence how managers from different 
types of organizations construe meaning from their environment, evaluate problems, and ascribe value (Vurro, 
Dacin & Perrini, 2010; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Boltanski & Thevenot, 1991). They provide context for social 
influence in decision-making (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) and guide and constrain organizational behaviour by 
signaling what constitutes rational and appropriate action (Thornton, 2004; March & Olsen, 1989) in and across 
situations. 
Page 61 of 121 
2010). The greater the heterogeneity in the types of partners co-owning a facility, the greater the 
chance that the significantly higher effort invested in working together will pay off (Thomas & 
Ely, 2009; Lax & Sebenius, 1986) in the form of improved environmental performance.  
Greater heterogeneity may prove particularly helpful in mitigating cancerous emissions 
because of the recognized and agreed-upon harm attributable to these chemicals. Non-cancerous 
chemicals, however, may garner less attention since they are generally perceived to be less 
detrimental to human health (Berman & Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989) and their harm 
remains contestable. In other words, greater heterogeneity may undermine or deemphasize 
mitigating non-cancerous chemicals. I therefore predict a positive relationship between coalition 
heterogeneity and pollution mitigation for cancerous byproducts and an inverse relationship 
between coalition heterogeneity and pollution mitigation for non-cancerous hazardous 
byproducts. 
Hypothesis 5: Co-owned facilities with more coalition heterogeneity will a) emit more 
cancerous byproducts and b) mitigate less non-cancerous byproducts. 
3.5 METHODS 
3.5.1 Data and Sample 
To examine the influence of ownership composition on JV’s pollution mitigation, I used 
the National Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI), Canada’s federally legislated inventory of 
industrial hazardous substances. The NPRI is similar to the U.S.-based Toxic Release Inventory 
(TRI), which scholars commonly use to research environmental performance (Berchicci et al., 
2012; King & Lenox, 2001, 2002; King & Shaver, 2001; Klassen & Whybark, 1999). Along with 
detailed information on each facility’s emissions and abatement efforts, the NPRI provides 
additional facility-level information on the allocation of ownership that remains unavailable 
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within the TRI. Specifically, it identifies not only whether a facility is independently or jointly 
owned but also the composition of ownership within JVs.   
Federal law requires annual reports from over 8,800 facilities exceeding 20,000 annual 
man-hours and exceeding chemical-use thresholds for any one of over 300 hazardous chemicals 
(Environment Canada, 2013a). Environment Canada is responsible for ensuring the integrity of 
the self-reported data and randomly conducts on site visits to verify reports. If Environment 
Canada identifies any inaccuracies, firms are legally obliged to correct their reports.  
To eliminate bias attributable to new chemicals being added to reporting requirements 
over time (Environment Canada, 2013d), I examined only those chemicals within the NPRI that 
required reports as of 2004.
30
 An analysis of the data for inconsistencies or disparities suggested 
that less than one percent of the reports appeared questionable to errors of omission and 
commission,
31
 and thus the original publically available data was not altered. I examined the 
population of non-military JV facilities between 2004 and 2009, providing a final sample of 315 
JV facility-year observations for 86 JVs in 37 industries.
32
 
3.5.2 Dependent Variable 
 I measured JVs’ environmental performance by examining their facilities’ pollution 
mitigation – specifically, the amount of recycling and treatment of hazardous waste prior to 
                                                          
30
 A list of chemicals examined in this analysis is provided in Appendix A. 
31
 An error of omission or commission was assumed when 1) a facility consistently filed reports for four contiguous 
years and failed to provide a report in one of the years in the sampling frame, 2) a facility failed to report a chemical 
one year while consistently reporting the chemical in previous and future years, 3) a facility report on a specified 
chemical exceeded a 500% annual difference without being part of an apparent upward or downward trend for the 
facility’s use of that chemical, and 4) where someone obviously made a data-entry error on the fields observed in 
this study. No obvious data-entry errors occurred in the reports examined in this study.  
32
 A list of industries examined in this analysis is provided in Appendix B. 
Page 63 of 121 
disposal. This amount was not dependent upon nor predetermined by the levels of production; it 
reflected voluntary action
33
  and was directly comparable across facilities. 
I differentiated between cancerous and non-cancerous human health hazards by using the 
Tool for the Reduction and Assessment of Chemical and other environmental Impacts (TRACI) 
(Bare et al., 2003; Toffel & Marshall, 2004). TRACI provides weights for chemical hazards 
based upon their cancerous and non-cancerous properties as well as their human exposure 
pathways, that is, whether a chemical is inhaled or absorbed through ingestion or contact.
34
 I 
calculated pollution mitigation measures with the equation: 
  ∑                     
where   represents the total tonnage of chemical c recycled, typically affecting humans through 
exposure pathway e, in year t for facility f, and   equals the hazardous weight provided by 
TRACI for chemical c for exposure pathway e.   represents the total tonnage of chemical c 
treated prior to disposal. I performed a log transformation on the dependent variable to correct 
for skewness and kurtosis. 
3.5.3 Independent variables 
 JV scholars provide several thresholds, ranging from five percent (Killing, 1983) to 
twenty percent (Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004) equity ownership, that indicate when minority 
partners actively participate in a JV. Since I examine the extent to which levels of ownership 
                                                          
33
 While laws and regulations may limit certain releases of hazardous byproducts, facilities have multiple options for 
disposing of hazardous waste without recycling or treatment prior to disposal. 
34
 Since, by definition, a treated or recycled chemical never leads to exposure, some assumptions are required to 
weight chemical hazards for pollution mitigation.  I used TRACI’s inhalation weights for treatment by incineration 
and TRACI’s absorption weights for physical, chemical, biological, and municipal sewage treatment.  For recycling, 
I used TRACI’s inhalation weights for energy recovery and TRACI’s absorption weights for solvents, organic 
substances, metals and metal compounds, inorganic materials, acids and bases, catalysts, abatement residue, and 
used oil. 
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influence environmental performance, I examined all equity joint ventures where the second 
largest partner holds a minimum of five percent equity. I operationalized ownership dispersion 
by using a Herfendahl-like measure that simultaneously accounted for the number of owners and 
their respective shares:  
                           ∑    
   
where n represents the number of each partner owning a portion of joint-venture j, and   
represents the percentage ownership for partner n. The measure approached -1 for single owners 
with high stakes (low dispersion) and zero for multiple owners with small stakes (high 
dispersion). 
I operationalized the influence of each type of partner by computing the percentage of 
total ownership held by public firms, private firms, JV firms, and government agencies within 
each JV.
35
 To avoid perfect multi-collinearity, I did not include public firms as a control; thus the 
effects of private, JV, and government ownership were in relation to public ownership.  
 Coalition heterogeneity captures the spread of influence among four categories of owners 
known to differ systematically in their preference for and attention to environmental issues – 
government, private firms, public firms, and other (second-order) joint ventures.
36
 I used the 
same Herfendahl-like formula used to calculate ownership dispersion, but aggregate the 
percentage of ownership for each type of partner to capture coalition heterogeneity: 
                             ∑  
   
                                                          
35
 I considered crown corporations as government ownership. 
36
 Because ownership dispersion by partner and ownership dispersion by partner type are distinct constructs, I 
theorized and tested their effects separately; empirically the two measures were not significantly correlated and the 
reported results were robust to their simultaneous inclusion. 
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where g represents the category of ownership and   equals the sum of ownership stakes by firms 
in category g. This measure theoretically ranges between -1 and -0.25, equals -1 when all firms 
belong to the same category, and equals -0.25 when all four categories of ownership are equally 
represented.   
 I further probed the influence of dominant ownership by constructing two additional 
measures. FiftyPlus captured majority ownership by any partner and was set to one if any partner 
owned greater than 50% and zero otherwise. I controlled for the differential difficulty of 
attaining agreement on any given issue by controlling for the number of partners in each joint 
venture (NumberOfPartners). Since these additional measures were highly correlated with both 
ownership dispersion and coalition heterogeneity, I included them in tests of partner-type 
influence only. 
3.5.4 Control Variables 
 Within the analysis, I also controlled for alternative explanations of environmental 
performance. I included facility size (FacilitySize) and the number of peer facilities owned by the 
same joint-venture (PeerFacilities) to capture any scale or scope economies in pollution 
mitigation and/or learning effects across facilities. As in former pollution studies (Berchicci, 
Dowell, & King, 2012; Harrison & Antweiler, 2003; King & Lenox, 2001, 2002; King & Shaver, 
2001), as a crude measure of production, I operationalized FacilitySize by the number of facility 
employees since larger facilities may achieve scale or scope economies for mitigating hazardous 
waste and since larger firms adopt more proactive environmental policies (Darnall, Henriques, & 
Sadorsky, 2010). 
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I included the number of chemicals (NumberofChemicals) released by each facility since 
prior research suggests that the number of chemicals processed by a facility may affect 
hazardous waste processing, in part by creating opportunities for accelerating the development of 
requisite capabilities (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2011; S. Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997). I 
included the percentage of foreign ownership (ForeignOwnership) since King and Shaver (2001) 
suggested that foreign-owned establishments may produce more unique waste that could hinder 
their pollution abatement efforts. I also included the percentage of ownership represented by 
firms on the S&P 500 index and the S&P TSX 60 index (S&P Constituent) to capture the 
influence of additional market scrutiny on environmental performance (Lee, 2009; Villalonga, 
2004). Finally, I included the volume of hazardous waste (Byproducts) produced by each facility, 
cancerous (CanByproducts) and non-cancerous (NoncanByproducts), respectively, in case 
hazardous waste volume influences pollution mitigation.   
3.5.6 Analysis  
I used standard OLS pooled regression analysis, clustering errors by facility to capture 
correlation in the error term arising from the same JV facilities reporting in multiple years 
(Rodgers, 1993). Province, year, and industry (3-digit SIC) fixed effects accounted for 
differences arising from cultural and legal differences, annual trends, and industry specific 
factors. The following two equations present the baseline regressions for the analysis: 
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The baseline model captured 43.8% of the variance in the data for cancerous pollution 
mitigation and 72.7% of the variance for non-cancerous pollution mitigation. The independent 
variables contributed to an additional 0.1% to 15.2% statistical significance in the model.  
However, more importantly (Miller, 2008; Weisberg, 2004), the independent variables 
demonstrated substantive significance in explaining variance in pollution mitigation for 
substances known to cause human harm. 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations for the data used in the 
analysis. Correlations among predictors and control variables were modest to moderate, and the 
largest variance inflation factor among independent variables was 4.01, alleviating concerns 
about multi-collinearity (Kennedy, 1997; Neter et al., 1996). As expected, JV facilities produced 
far more non-cancerous than cancerous byproducts, and perhaps because of this disparity, JV 
facilities addressed approximately 5.18% of their non-cancerous waste through pollution 
mitigation but only 0.28% of their cancerous waste. This finding could result from different 
technologies, capabilities, or control efficiencies. 
Table 8 reports the unhypothesized effects of the predictors on hazardous waste volume. 
While the patterns of hazardous waste volume may foreshadow some of the predictions, they 
cannot fully explain why ownership will elicit different patterns of pollution mitigation.  
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
  Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Non-cancerous volume 251,240 943,619 0 6,968,242  1        
2 Cancerous volume   28.28       276 0        4,859 0.0508  1       
3 Non-cancerous mitigation   13,001  94,179 0    905,034 0.0884 0.3557  1      
4 Cancerous mitigation     0.08    0.57 0        6.00 -0.0364 -0.0078 -0.0173 1     
5 Ownership dispersion    -0.47    0.10 -0.91       -0.20 -0.0302 0.2060 0.3588 0.1776  1    
6 Percent government ownership     0.02    0.10 0        0.51 -0.0508 -0.0188 -0.0296 -0.0288 -0.0387  1   
7 Percent private ownership     0.18    0.28 0        1 -0.1267 -0.0336 -0.0618 -0.0857 -0.0755 0.0111  1  
8 Percent partnership ownership     0.05    0.15 0        0.95 -0.0501 -0.0163 -0.0433 -0.0428 -0.3027 0.3408 0.0172  1 
9 Coalition heterogeneity   -0.84    0.21 -1       -0.43 -0.1444 -0.0096 -0.0450 0.0433 0.0854 0.3378 0.5107 0.3565 
10 Facility size       457      747 2        4,600 0.0891 0.3125 0.5946 -0.0671 0.2518 -0.0886 -0.1695 -0.0959 
11 Peer facilities    4.62  16.31 0           121 -0.0409 -0.0187 -0.0241 -0.0056 -0.0684 -0.0498 0.0050 0.0800 
12 Foreign ownership  24.17  35.64 0           100 -0.1428 -0.0541 -0.0758 -0.0936 -0.1438 -0.0038 0.0428 0.1750 
13 S&P constituency  23.89  32.41 0           100 -0.0647 0.1230 0.2188 0.0535 0.2464 -0.1566 -0.2377 -0.2156 
14  Number of chemicals  13.11  11.67 1             57 0.2654 0.2683 0.4251 0.1274 0.1102 -0.0476 -0.1909 0.0359 
15 Number of partners    2.75    1.41 2               8 -0.0489 0.2761 0.5042 0.0142 0.7752 -0.0571 -0.1640 -0.0868 
16 Fifty plus    0.48    0.50 0              1 -0.1728 -0.0771 -0.1318 -0.1310 -0.3687 -0.0040 0.1163 0.1501 
 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
9 Coalition heterogeneity  1        
10 Facility size -0.1479  1       
11 Peer facilities -0.0313 -0.0960  1      
12 Foreign ownership 0.0106  0.0434  0.0078  1     
13 S&P constituency -0.3166  0.0438 -0.1114 -0.2021  1    
14  Number of chemicals -0.1176  0.3910  0.0752 -0.2826 -0.0585  1   
15 Number of partners -0.0220  0.3516 -0.0816 -0.1047 0.3671 0.1903  1  
16 Fifty plus 0.0210 -0.1603  0.1632  0.2463 -0.0308 -0.2232 -0.1269  1 
Note:  n = 315. The minimum reported total toxic emissions exceeds zero, but rounds to zero. Correlations (absolute value) greater than 0.1105 (0.1449) are significant 
          at the 5% (1%) level. 
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Table 8: Predictors on un-hypothesized hazardous waste volume 
 
p<.001 = ***; p<.01 = **; p<.05 = *; p<.1 = *, one-tailed 
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses 
Percent government, private, and partnership ownership in relation to ownership by publically traded firms 
 





















Dispersion    - 3.1673      76.6790          
   (17.4702)    (63.2282)          
Perc. Govt.         - 14.1234   - 43.3708 **     
          (13.1030)    (20.6027)      
                 Perc. Private             7.3896 **  - 4.8592      
           (3.8166)   (6.3846)      
                 Perc. Partnership         - 11.8154   - 15.8416      
            (7.2648)    (14.2749)      
Own-type Dispersion               0.8616   22.3336 * 
             (4.5818)  (15.6261)  
                 
Ln(Facility Size) - 0.4117  - 0.3848    0.0665   - 0.6107     0.3092   - 4.2112  - 0.3739    1.0472  
  (1.6853)   (1.6148)   (4.1644)    (3.9954)   (1.2730)    (4.5439)   (1.7102)   (3.8832)  
                 Ln(Peer Facilities) - 3.8426 * - 3.8646 * - 0.3112     0.2433  - 3.6013 *  - 2.6696  - 3.8259 *   0.1212  
  (2.5261)   (2.5410)   (2.8993)    (2.9454)   (2.3189)    (3.4473)   (2.5547)  (2.9234)  
                 Ln(Foreign Ownership)   0.2696 ***   0.2748 ***   0.1970     0.0658     0.4296 ***  - 0.0298    0.2666 ***   0.1190  
  (0.1038)  (0.1137)   (0.2443)    (0.1866)   (0.1600)    (0.1788)  (0.1015)  (0.2337)  
                 Ln(S&P Constituent) - 0.1833  - 0.1844 * - 0.2695   - 0.2415  - 0.2411 * - 0.1058  - 0.1770  - 0.1071  
  (0.1528)   (0.1525)   (0.2247)    (0.2436)   (0.1540)   (0.2232)   (0.1661)   (0.2628)  
                 Ln(No. Chemicals)   2.9747    2.9555   14.0777 **  14.5604 ***    4.8575 * 16.0132 ***   2.9991  14.7099 ** 
  (3.0102)  (2.9872)   (6.4697)    (6.0302)    (3.0886)   (5.6746)  (3.0368)  (6.5890)  
                 Ln(No. Partners)         - 10.0506    50.1059 *     
            (8.2780)  (28.3765)      
                 Fifty_plus            4.4646 **    8.8703 ***     
           (1.9001)    (3.3696)      
                                  
Province Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
                 
Adjusted    0.4608  0.4588  0.2838  0.3363  0.4799  0.4348  0.4588  0.2989  
Δ      0.0020    0.0525  0.0211  0.1510  0.0020  0.0151  
Facilities 86  86  86  86  86  86  86  86  
n 315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  
Page 70 of 121 
2.6 RESULTS 
Table 9 provides the results of the main analysis. Hypothesis 1A predicted that, ceteris 
paribus, JV facilities will mitigate a similar amount of cancerous byproducts because the 
cancerous classification removes doubt as to the hazard and the appropriateness of addressing 
these substances. Consistent with the hypothesis 1A, Table 9 shows that greater ownership 
dispersion does not influence the mitigation of cancerous emissions – dispersed and concentrated 
owners mitigate cancerous emissions to a similar extent. A power analysis of the null hypothesis 
for a sample size of 325, a minimum    of 0.5352, 58 predictors, a sample size of 315, and a 
type-1 error rate of .001 indicated the statistical power for the regression is 1, confirming there 
was sufficient statistical power to support the null hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1B explained that facilities will mitigate less non-cancerous waste as 
ownership dispersion increases because, as the number of owners increases and as their equity 
shares become more balanced, they will increasingly struggle to align divergent interests and 
their likelihood of accolades or blame for environmental performance declines. Counter to the 
hypothesis, the results indicated a strong and significant positive relationship between ownership 
dispersion and pollution mitigation for non-cancerous byproducts; thus, I reject hypothesis 1B. 
While JVs with more owners face additional challenges in aligning interests and agreeing 
(Parkhe, 1993; van de Ven, 1976; Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Demsetz, 1967), more represented 
interests and opinions in the ownership coalition appears to lead to better outcomes, perhaps by 
bringing together a broader range of capabilities (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2011; Sharma & 
Vrendenburg, 1998; Russo & Fouts, 1997; Shrivastava, 1995) and/or co-creating economies of 
scale and scope.  
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p<.001 = ***; p<.01 = **; p<.05 = *; p<.1 = *, one-tailed 
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses 




Hypothesis 1B  
Hypotheses  
2A, 3A, 4A 
Hypotheses  
2B , 3B, 4B 
Hypothesis 5A Hypotheses 5B 
























Dispersion    - 2.6527     11.5365 *         
     (5.0833)      (7.8747)          
Perc. Govt.          18.7431 ***  12.0307 *     
           (5.8753)    (8.4815)      
                 Perc. Private          0.4775  - 4.3197      
           (1.1065)   (4.6963)      
                 Perc. Partnership         - 1.9558    0.7700      
          (2.6298)   (5.1007)      
Own Type Dispersion              3.6831 * - 6.7689 ** 
             (2.6240)   (4.0556)  
                 
Ln(Facility Size) - 2.4149 ** - 2.3925 * - 0.6908  - 0.7881  - 1.8622 * - 0.6105  - 2.2533 ** - 0.9886  
  (1.3644)   (1.3636)   (1.2900)   (1.2658)   (1.0526)   (1.0690)  (1.2894)   (1.2583)  
                 Ln(Peer Facilities) - 1.0542 ** - 1.0736 * - 1.9484 * - 1.8716  - 0.8716  - 1.4955  - 0.9843  - 2.0771 * 
  (0.6306)   (0.6292)   (1.4521)   (1.4655)   (0.5275)   (1.3069)  (0.6023)   (1.3951)  
                 Ln(Foreign Ownership)   0.0286    0.0330    0.0257    0.0089  - 0.0118  - 0.0030   0.0158    0.0478  
  (0.0686)   (0.0697)   (0.0945)   (0.0931)   (0.0407)   (0.0937)  (0.0642)   (0.0955)  
                 Ln(S&P Constituent) - 0.0049  - 0.0059  - 0.1332  - 0.1321  - 0.0026  - 0.1319   0.0218  - 0.1804  
  (0.0367)   (0.0370)   (0.1374)   (0.1323)   (0.0268)   (0.1193)  (0.0429)   (0.1413)  
                 Ln(No. Chemicals)   4.0560 ***   4.0406 ***   8.0478 ****   8.2744 ****    3.3881 ***   6.3351 ***  4.1613 ***    7.7501 **** 
  (1.4271)   (1.4299)   (1.8864)   (1.8805)    (1.2905)   (2.1105)  (1.4334)    (2.0192)  
                 Ln(No. Partners)         - 4.2257  - 2.2194      
          (4.7710)  (4.9171)      
                 Fifty_plus           0.4648  - 5.1682 **     
          (0.7416)   (2.3106)      
                 Ln(Can Byproducts)   0.0344   0.0342        0.0337     0.0341    
  (0.0295)  (0.0299)      (0.0314)    (0.0296)    
                 Ln(Noncan Byproducts)       0.1027 ****   0.0916 ****     0.1316 ****     0.1102 **** 
       (0.0260)   (0.0267)     (0.0262)    (0.0276)  
                 
Province Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
                 
Adjusted    0.4375  0.4365  0.7266  0.7292  0.5890  0.7543  0.4471  0.7320  
Δ      0.0010    0.0026  0.1515  0.0281  0.0096  0.0054  
Facilities 86  86  86  86  86  86  86  86  
n 315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  
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Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 suggested that different types of owners would drive 
environmental outcomes in different directions. Hypothesis 2 explained that the additional 
scrutiny that accompanies government ownership will encourage co-owned facilities to address 
more hazardous externalities; that is, co-owners will be more likely to internalize and more 
stringently mitigate their hazardous waste. Table 9 columns 5 and 6 show supportive evidence 
for hypotheses 2A & 2B which state that government ownership improves pollution mitigation 
for both cancerous and non-cancerous hazardous waste. The effects are practically important: for 
each percent increase in government ownership, the results indicated an approximate 20.6% 
increase in cancerous pollution mitigation
37
 and an approximate 12.8% increase in non-
cancerous pollution mitigation.
38
   
Hypothesis 3 drew attention to the non-economic utility that private owners derive from 
corporate social responsibility, predicting that a higher percentage of private ownership may 
elicit greater mitigation for both types of chemicals. Neither was significant in my sample, so 
there was no support for the hypothesized private-firm effect. Dialing up or down the percentage 
of private ownership did not influence the level of mitigation for hazardous byproducts, and thus 
hypotheses 3A and 3B are rejected. While non-significant, this finding should be interpreted with 
caution. We know from prior literature that private firms are more likely to heed their own 
values, but if an equal number subscribe to moral duty and profit-maximization perspectives, the 
effects will effectively cancel each other out.  
                                                          
37
 The percentage difference for JV facilities is determined by examining the exponentiated coefficient of the JV 
indicator variable such that a one unit increase in   corresponds to the change in the dependent variable.  Since the 
variable is a percentage: exp(           =  exp(18.7431*0.01) – 1 = 0.2061 
38
 Using an indicator variable for government ownership in place of the percentage of government ownership 
indicated that government ownership significantly and substantially increased cancerous pollution mitigation, but 
non-cancerous pollution mitigation was non-significant. 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted a Russian doll effect whereby the more equity other joint-ventures 
hold in a co-owned facility, the harder it gets for the partners at the table to identify and agree 
upon appropriate action. The hypothesized effects were, again, non-significant, so hypotheses 4A 
and 4B are rejected. This result suggests that even abnormal complications, such as adding high 
percentages of nested JV ownership, do not set facilities back, despite the cognitive limits of 
managers and their inability to address such complex and conflicting environmental issues. 
Future studies may provide additional insights into the sensitivity of co-owned facilities to 
multiple layers of equity ownership and other forms of control, asking whether it is the 
indirectness of this type of holding or its hidden nature that keeps JV-owned facilities in this 
study comparable to their peers.  
 The last hypothesis stated that greater coalition heterogeneity will improve the ability of 
co-owned facilities to mitigate cancerous byproducts and undermine their ability to mitigate non-
cancerous byproducts. Theoretically, H5 mirrors H1 with one difference. Precisely because of 
the added complexity and co-ordination challenges associated with finding and fusing different 
frames, I argued and found that co-owned facilities try harder and succeed at ratcheting up 
mitigation for cancerous waste. Consistent with hypothesis 5B, I also found that greater partner-
type heterogeneity was associated with lesser effort and/or effectiveness at mitigating non-
cancerous emissions. A summary of hypothesized effects along with the analysis findings is 
provided in Table 10.
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Table 10: Summary of hypothesized effects and analysis findings 
Hypothesis Finding 
H1A:    There is no relationship between ownership dispersion and 
             pollution mitigation for cancerous substances 
Supported 
H1B: As ownership dispersion increases, co-owned facilities’ pollution  
          mitigation for non-cancerous hazardous substances decreases. 
Not supported 
H2A: A higher percentage of government ownership increases pollution  
          mitigation for cancerous byproducts 
Supported 
H2B: A higher percentage of government ownership increases pollution  
          mitigation for non-cancerous byproducts. 
Supported 
H3A: A higher percentage of private-firm ownership increases pollution  
          mitigation for cancerous substances. 
Not supported 
H3B: A higher percentage of private-firm ownership increases pollution  
          mitigation for non-cancerous substances. 
Not supported 
H4A: A higher percentage of joint-venture ownership decreases pollution  
          mitigation for cancerous substances. 
Not supported 
H4A: A higher percentage of joint-venture ownership decreases pollution  
          mitigation for non-cancerous substances. 
Not supported 
H5A: Co-owned facilities with more coalition heterogeneity mitigate more  
          cancerous byproducts 
Supported 
H5B: Co-owned facilities with more coalition heterogeneity mitigate less  
          non-cancerous byproducts 
Supported 
 
3.6.1 Robustness Checks 
 Studies of environmental performance remain highly susceptible to measurement error, 
especially for studies of hazardous byproducts. Toffel and Marshal (2004) highlighted that 
whether or not significant findings arise partially depends upon the weighting mechanisms 
scholars use to capture the hazard associated with each chemical. To provide a stronger test of 
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the hypothesized relationships, I reweighted chemical hazards using the Environmental Defense 
Fund’s Toxicity Equivalent Potential Scorecard (TEPS) and reran analysis for the hypothesized 
relationships in this study. TEPS is similar to TRACI in that it provides cancerous and non-
cancerous weights for chemicals based upon their human exposure pathways. However, TEPS 
examines fewer chemicals than TRACI, which could account for differences between the 
robustness checks and main analysis. The results of these robustness checks are provided in 
Table 11.  
 The robustness checks replicated all the findings in the main analysis, with two 
exceptions. First, the robustness check of the relationship between government ownership and 
improved pollution mitigation failed to find evidence that government ownership improves the 
ability of co-owned facilities to mitigate non-cancerous byproducts. Notably, the robustness 
check did reconfirm increased mitigation of cancerous byproducts. Second, the robustness check 
of the relationship between private ownership and non-cancerous pollution mitigation was 
significant, although counter to the direction hypothesized. This result was somewhat surprising, 
given that prior studies of family control over public firms examined cases of co-ownership 
among widely dispersed principles (Berrone et al., 2010). However, we might expect that the 
influence of family ownership creates a broad range of responses because private firms can take 
greater liberty to do a lot more, or a lot less, depending on what they value. 
.
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p<.001 = ***; p<.01 = **; p<.05 = *; p<.1 = *, one-tailed 
Robust standard errors clustered by facility in parentheses 






2A, 3A, 4A 
Robustness 
2B, 3B, 4B 
Robustness 5A Robustness 5B 
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Dispersion   - 2.7191     12.7187 *         
    (5.0703)      (8.3332)          
Perc. Govt.          18.6058 ***   7.2817      
          (5.8503)   (7.7485)      
                 Perc. Private            0.4732  - 7.6149 **     
          (1.0965)   (4.1498)      
                 Perc. Partnership         - 2.0594    3.7422      
          (2.6100)   (5.4209)      
Own Type Dispersion               3.6268 * - 7.2931 * 
              (2.6059)   (4.3609)  
                 
Ln(Facility Size) - 2.3959 ** - 2.3729 ** - 0.6731  - 0.7980  - 1.8464 * - 0.8635  - 2.2372 * - 0.9837  
  (1.3550)   (1.3538)   (1.3573)   (1.3264)   (1.0465)   (1.2758)   (1.2813)   (1.3536)  
                 Ln(Peer Facilities) - 1.0581 ** - 1.0773 * - 2.2634 ** - 2.1754  - 0.8791 * - 2.2159 ** - 0.9906 * - 2.4043 * 
  (0.6240)   (0.6223)   (1.3411)   (1.3566)   (0.5207)   (1.2758)   (0.5962)   (1.3016)  
                 Ln(Foreign Ownership)   0.0271    0.0316    0.0158  0.0079  - 0.0126  - 0.0409    0.0147    0.0380  
  (0.0687)   (0.0697)   (0.0869)  (0.0869)   (0.0405)   (0.0841)   (0.0643)   (0.0893)  
                 Ln(S&P Constituent) - 0.0048  - 0.0058  - 0.0250  - 0.0236  - 0.0028  - 0.0194    0.0214  - 0.0763  
  (0.0365)   (0.0367)   (0.1013)   (0.0976)   (0.0264)   (0.0868)   (0.0426)   (0.1088)  
                 Ln(No. Chemicals)   4.0426 ***   4.0263 **   8.6951 ****   8.8823 ****   3.3864 ***   7.0839 ***   4.1474    8.4250 **** 
  (1.4196)   (1.4225)   (1.9386)   (1.9573)   (1.2838)   (2.3219)   (1.4267)   (2.0801)  
                 Ln(No. Partners)         - 4.2045    1.9134      
          (4.7430)   (6.0104)      
                 Fifty_plus           0.5259  - 3.9606 **     
          (0.7081)   (1.9320)      
                 Ln(Can Byproducts)   0.0352    0.0352        0.0343      0.0345    
  (0.0291)   (0.0294)       (0.0302)     (0.0291)    
                 Ln(Noncan Byproducts)       0.0738 *   0.0605      0.0869 *     0.0815 * 
      (0.0474)   (0.0471)     (0.0515)     (0.0464)  
                 
Province Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Year Fixed Effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
                 
Adjusted    0.4379  0.4371  0.7249  0.7287  0.4942  0.7561  0.4452  0.7309  
Δ      0.0008    0.0038  0.0563  0.0312  0.0073  0.0060  
Facilities 86  86  86  86  86  86  86  86  
n 315  315  315  315  315  315  315  315  
 Page 77 of 121 
 
3.7 DISCUSSION 
This study provides new insights into the relationship between ownership and 
environmental outcomes by theorizing and testing how multiple and different types of owners 
shape one critical aspect of JVs’ environmental performance – namely, pollution mitigation. By 
examining the characteristics of ownership coalitions within JV organizations, I uncovered why 
some JV facilities address their hazardous externalities more than others. Specifically, the 
characteristics of the coalition and the characteristics of its members systematically influence the 
extent to which JV facilities exhibit a moral duty or profit maximization tendencies when 
considering pollution mitigation. The tendency hinges upon the characteristics of the coalition 
and the characteristics of its members. 
Relatively equal partners shift the tendency toward moral duty, while majority-ownership 
shifts the tendency toward profit-maximization, although to a lesser extent. More owners with 
more balanced equity stakes raise the bar for mitigating non-cancerous hazardous byproducts, 
even though these coalitions face greater difficulties aligning interests and coming to agreement 
(Parkhe, 1993; van de Ven, 1976; Cartwright & Zander, 1968). While my data could not identify 
why this shift occurs, two explanations seem likely. Similar co-owners with relatively equal 
shares may be more likely to actively discuss operational decisions and their environmental 
impacts, thus elucidating potential harm and facilitating discussions of moral duty. Alternatively, 
JV managers representing similar yet dispersed owners may have more discretion or direction in 
making socially beneficial operational decisions.   
In contrast to ownership dispersion, coalition heterogeneity exhibits a nuanced 
relationship with pollution mitigation. When different types of owners participate in the JV 
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coalition, and when the categories of ownership are symmetric, facilities’ pollution mitigation for 
non-cancerous byproducts suffers and pollution mitigation for cancerous byproduct improves. 
Similarity improves partners’ co-operation (Brickson, 2000; Tyler, 1999) and thus facilitates 
agreement upon the necessity, appropriateness, and manner of mitigating harm, but different 
perspectives among coalition members can undermine the remission of ambiguous and/or 
contestable harm. When different viewpoints regarding the appropriateness of mitigating 
hazardous waste ensue, the JV shifts towards a profit-maximization tendency that indisputably 
contributes to economic interests of owners. Notably, the contestation of harm places the locus of 
tendency upon chemicals’ socially designated and accepted hazards; the cancer/non-cancer 
classification appears to polarize JVs’ response to moral duty. In cases of known harm (cancer), 
more heterogeneous JV coalitions go above and beyond to address hazardous externalities, thus 
shifting to a moral-duty tendency.  
Government ownership appears to tip the scale in favour of moral duty. Again, the data in 
this study could not determine the exact mechanism by which this shift occurs, but the effects of 
government ownership were significant and substantial for pollution mitigation of cancerous and 
non-cancerous substances. It is possible that government imposes its will in favour of moral duty 
– namely, more pollution mitigation – ex ante as condition of its financial backing of a venture. 
It is equally likely that the very presence of government within the ownership coalition naturally 
shifts the perspective towards moral duty as owners consider the enforcer of social expectations 
within their midst.   
3.7.1 Limitations 
As in any empirical undertaking, this study has a number of limitations. First, this study 
examines only one dimension of environmental performance, pollution mitigation. I chose to 
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examine pollution mitigation deliberately because it is comparable across facilities, firms, and 
industries and bears immediate and notable consequences for human health. However, the 
relationship between JV facilities’ ownership composition and pollution prevention may differ 
because of the substantial resource commitments (Arora & Cason, 1995; Hirschhorn, 1994), 
ambiguity of returns (King & Lenox, 2002; Klassen & Whybark, 1999; Elkington, 1998; Hart & 
Ahuja, 1996), and delayed returns (Slawinski, 2010; Sarkis & Cordeiro, 2001) surrounding these 
initiatives. This potential difference gives rise to future opportunities to explore additional 
relationships between these and other characteristics of ownership and other aspects of 
environmental performance. 
Second, while I theorized that co-owners engage with one another and co-determine the 
level of mitiation over hazardous emissions, the data did not allow me to verify whether or how 
fully such engagement actually occurs. Some JV facilities represent collaboratively managed 
operations while, in others, one owner is assigned operational authority and other partners 
represent investors in the enterprise (Killing, 1983). It is possible that JVs with one operational 
authority behave more like independent firms or majority-owned JVs than like collaboratively 
managed ventures. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that co-owners without operational 
authority still influence environmental performance. ConocoPhillips, for instance, recently 
complained that a JV partner, China National Overseas Oil Corporation, prevented them from 
prudently preparing for environmental containment in the event of an oil spill, even though 
ConocoPhillips had operational authority over the co-owned facility (Rapoza, 2012; Watts, 
2011).   
While this example demonstrates that non-operating partners can influence 
environmental performance, the extent to which JVs with one operational authority differ should 
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receive more theoretical and empirical attention. If variance does exist in the nature and/or levels 
of engagement, then the findings in this study constitute conservative estimates. Furthermore, my 
findings are orientative rather than definitive. By showing how different characteristics of 
ownership can be used as levers to systematically increase mitigation for cancerous and non-
cancerous emissions, I neither mean to imply that these predictors will always be effective nor 
equally effective across facilities. I merely suggest that ownership matters and that it may offer 
willing parties a wide range of tools to help them more deliberately balance self-interest and 
moral duty. 
Third, while the empirical context provides wide variance in coalition heterogeneity, 
certain configurations of ownership are conspicuously missing. For example, none of the JVs in 
the data contained a coalition of all JV owners or a coalition of government, JV owners, and 
private owners without public ownership. Further, some of the existing configurations are more 
highly represented in certain industries than others, and each type of owner does not necessarily 
participate in each industry. It remains possible that certain types of industries share 
characteristics that could partially explain variations in pollution mitigation or that different 
types of owners behave differently in different industries. 
3.7.2 Implications for Theory and Practice 
While the findings are provocative, this study is merely a first step towards uncovering 
how ownership coalitions shape environmental outcomes. The results may not fully generalize to 
less regulated contexts or to other aspects of environmental performance dissociated with human 
health. This study simply highlights that ownership coalitions matter, and it opens exciting new 
opportunities for future studies to identify which configurations matter most, when, where, why, 
and to what extent. 
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On average, co-owned facilities address a much larger percentage of their non-cancerous 
externalities through pollution mitigation compared to cancerous externalities. On the surface, 
this appears to suggest that, overall, co-owned facilities do not put a lot of effort into reducing 
cancerous externalities. However, the empirical context of this study does not indicate the level 
of effort required to mitigate harm. Many cancerous substances, such as hexachlorodibenzofuran, 
are highly toxic and do not require substantial exposure to produce acute effects. It remains 
possible that organizations must work harder and/or must spend more resources to address 
cancerous substances while, as a percentage of total hazards, the gains appear small. More 
research at the individual chemical level of analysis would help to determine the effort required 
for and the benefit gained from addressing each hazard. 
Additional research at lower levels of analysis is also required to determine the exact 
mechanisms by which ownership dispersion and coalition heterogeneity influence the moral-
duty/profit maximization tendency and whether, how, when, and why observed tendencies 
change over time. While it is easy enough to examine organizational behaviour, archival data 
alone cannot definitively determine why this behaviour occurs. Identifying the source of the 
tendency, how it reifies, and how it manifests will provide valuable information into how it can 
be changed for the common good.  
 This study clearly shows that co-owners can both help and hinder the mitigation of 
hazardous externalities, and it helps to elucidate the theoretical premise and the practical 
significance of choosing specific ownership configurations within JVs. Aside from the influence 
of government ownership, potential JV participants likely remain unaware of the environmental 
consequences of their organizing decisions. Building awareness of the environmental 
implications of organizing could go a long way towards mitigating harm. Firms should not only 
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ask “How do we organize to build economic value?” but also “How do we organize in the face of 
perceivable harm?” 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to former studies of ownership and environmental performance by 
showing how and theorizing why ownership coalitions influence pollution mitigation. I 
demonstrate how the number of partners within a coalition, their equity stakes, and their 
similarities and differences influence the extent to which organizations exhibit moral duty or 
profit maximization tendencies. I find that ownership dispersion contributes to the mitigation of 
non-cancerous hazards, thus contributing to a moral-duty tendency. However, coalition 
heterogeneity polarizes pollution mitigation based upon contestable harm, undermining pollution 
mitigation for non-cancerous yet hazardous byproducts and encouraging pollution mitigation for 
cancerous substances. Overall, this study provides strong evidence that the characteristics of a 
JV’s ownership coalition and the characteristics of the coalition’s members influence the extent 
to which JV facilities protect society from definitive and contestable harm.  





 This thesis brings to the fore the important but so far overlooked role co-ownership plays 
in environmental performance. Public concerns over environmental degradation have 
increasingly pressured firms and governments to address the imbalance between industry and the 
natural environment, but firms significantly and substantially differ in how well they respond to 
such public concerns and government policy.  
Scholars have established that firms exhibit unique sensitivities to the costs and 
incentives of environmental performance (Berrone et al., 2010; Darnall & Edwards, 2006; 
Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007), but very little is known about if and how firms’ individual 
preferences manifest in their co-owned subsidiary operations. My preliminary thesis posits that 
joint-venture (JV) organizations struggle to pursue environmental performance because co-
ownership confounds the alignment of social initiatives with each owner’s objectives, given co-
owners’ unique stakeholders (Darnall, Potoski, & Prakash, 2010; Darnall, Henriquez, & 
Sadorsky, 2009), preferences (Berrone et al., 2010; Schulze et al., 2001), and expected returns 
from these activities (Margolis et al., 2007; Branzei et al., 2004). I further argue that ambiguous 
societal expectations and harm exacerbate these alignment difficulties.  
The primary contribution of this dissertation is demonstrating that JVs, in general, and 
specific aspects of co-ownership, more specifically, carry systematic yet predictable biases that 
influence environmental performance. In Chapter 2, I argue that co-ownership creates a 
multiplicity of goals and tools that make environmental issues harder to handle and costlier to 
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manage. I find that co-ownership systematically increases hazardous emissions of non-cancerous 
substances and that societal pressure in the form of more stringent legal liability appears 
ineffective in regulating this bias. However, social consensus around the accepted harm of 
cancerous substances (Berman & Wandersman, 1990; Stahly, 1989) appears to encourage JV 
facilities to be equally mindful in reducing cancerous emissions.  
By focusing on why the simplest aspect of co-ownership (i.e., multiple versus single 
owners) matters, I contribute to the sustainability literature by highlighting how added 
complexity creeps in to confound already-challenging decisions. Co-owned facilities face a 
myriad of decision points that must be negotiated, including how to invest, where to invest, and 
how much to invest in environmental gains. When environmental outcomes hinge on multiple 
partners’ ability to identify the intersection of everyone’s strategic interests and to develop a path 
forward for environmental performance attainment, prioritizing socially-beneficial, yet 
economically ambiguous, investments is much harder than in situations where one corporation 
can unilaterally make decisions. I find robust evidence that environmental outcomes in JV 
facilities are sub-optimal due to predictable challenges in aligning the various mix of incentives 
for environmental performance into a unified strategy that is acceptable for and actionable by all 
parties involved. 
  This chapter also isolates some conditions that aggravate the JV bias. For example, 
ambiguous environmental categories make it much harder to agree, while unambiguous 
categories smooth the path toward identifying common ground to address hazardous byproducts. 
It also shows that neither social expectations nor regulations constitute effective antidotes for the 
co-ownership bias. Disproportionate liability regimes do not constrain JV facilities’ emissions. 
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However, a silver lining emerges when we delve more deeply into the differences between JVs; 
the problems arising from co-ownership can also be addressed through co-ownership. 
 In Chapter 3, I explore multiple aspects of co-ownership and show how the 
characteristics of the ownership coalition influence the actions facilities take to mitigate harm. I 
argue that three specific characteristics shift the extent to which JVs exhibit moral duty or profit 
maximization tendencies that polarize the accounts of when, why, and to what extent firms 
mitigate hazardous externalities (Margolis et al., 2007; van de Ven & Jeurissen, 2005; Scalise, 
2005; Cox & Hazen, 2003). First, I find robust evidence that JVs with more ownership 
dispersion (i.e., more owners with more balanced equity shares) gravitate toward moral duty 
tendency. JVs employ more pollution mitigation (i.e., recycling and treatment of hazardous 
byproducts prior to disposal) as ownership dispersion increases, and they remain equally mindful 
of mitigating cancerous byproducts regardless of ownership dispersion. Second, I find evidence 
that who participates in the coalition matters. Government ownership pushes JVs toward a moral 
duty tendency; facilities increasingly mitigate cancerous and non-cancerous byproducts as 
government ownership increases. Finally, I find robust evidence that heterogeneity within the 
coalition undermines pollution mitigation for non-cancerous substances and encourages pollution 
mitigation for cancerous substances.   
Chapter 3 identifies coordination difficulties as the mechanism by which the JV 
coalition’s characteristics influence environmental outcomes. Broader and balanced 
configurations build momentum towards working together to mitigate harm, but such enthusiasm 
must be tempered by arguments that co-ordinating understanding and action across complex 
issues is neither easy nor automatic. Greater diversity among partners creates challenges for 
pulling everyone in the right direction and increases the odds of slipping by, cutting corners, or 
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doing less when appropriate action and perceived harm remains contestable. When faced with 
ambiguity and conflicting opinions, JVs gravitate toward profit-maximization, which at least 
supports the financial interests of JV partners. However, in cases of less contestable harm, JVs 
go above and beyond to safely address cancerous byproducts. 
Overall, the empirical results in this thesis paint a picture of predictable, yet preventable, 
harm from hazardous byproducts. Co-ownership can be a great force for good, and there is 
increasing evidence that many parties can pool different resources and capabilities and overcome 
previously intractable problems (Branzei & Le Ber, 2013). Facilities consistently can and do 
behave similarly when it comes to cancerous byproducts, but they take considerable license 
when harm is ambiguous and/or contestable. Notably, the results suggest that awareness and 
agency inform organizational action. This finding resonates with a moral licensing argument in 
which firms do right sometimes only to do wrong at other times (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 
2010; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009), but the current studies do not directly address this 
angle. Longitudinal trajectories and repeated adjustments would be necessary before such 
presumptions could be extended from organizations to decision-makers.  
4.1 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to theory by drawing attention to the levers and mechanisms that 
confound organizations’ ability to address their hazardous byproducts. There has been increased 
attention to the subjects of corporate wrongdoing, (Palmer, 2012; Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; 
Frooman, 1997), why decision-makers fall short (i.e. strategic choice) (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 
2010; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009), and why stakeholders often fail to encourage actions 
that matter (Kock, Santaló, & Diestre, 2012; Darnall, Henriquez, & Sadorsky, 2009; Kassinis & 
Vafeas, 2006; Alge, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999). I provide a socio-structural account of why 
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some firms outperform others in addressing their hazardous byproducts. It is simply harder to 
collectively organize the divergent interests of multiple partners, and heterogeneous coalitions 
aggravate interest-alignment difficulties. Working with multiple co-owners provides more 
opportunities for doing harm but also for apt correction. 
Strategy scholars have spent considerable effort in attempting to entice firms into action 
by theorizing and testing how environmental performance “pays.” Co-ownership provides a new 
vantage point for incentives. Rather than taking incentives for granted, strategists must remember 
that different firms have different incentives for pursuing environmental performance (van de 
Ven & Jeurissen, 2005). One size does not fit all. What appeals to one, does not necessarily 
appeal to another. In cases of co-ownership, it is important to look at the mix of incentives 
brought to bear within the joint-venture and ask not only “When does it pay?” and “How does it 
pay?” but also “To whom does it pay?” and “Why does it payoff for some more than others?”  
This thesis also reveals that decision-makers recognize a moral duty to address their 
hazardous byproducts; co-owned facilities can and do protect the public from harm when it 
perceivably counts the most (i.e., cancerous byproducts). Attentiveness to the recycling and 
treatment of non-cancerous byproducts substantially improves with increasingly dispersed 
owners, who are less likely to face public censure for poor environmental outcomes (Teigen & 
Brun, 2011; Gailey & Lee, 2005; Sanders & Hamilton, 1997; Shaver, 1996; Fösterling, 1988). In 
cases of indisputable or less contestable hazard, heterogeneous coalitions, who face greater 
challenges in aligning their interests (Hoffman, 2011a, 2011b; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999), encourage far more recycling and treatment of cancerous waste.  
 Page 88 of 121 
 
These findings highlight that addressing hazardous byproducts is not simply a matter of 
corporate right-doing and wrongdoing but, rather, a series of decisions embedded within a socio-
structural context (Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) that really matters. 
Categories of harm and perceptions of harm influence the extent to which decision-makers 
overcome alignment difficulties to protect from harm. Making categories more relevant or 
requiring facilities to report emissions in human terms, such as disability life-adjusted years, 
could motivate more owners to act as one. Perhaps the simplest intervention lies in 
communicating with decision-makers that how partners organize and with whom partners 
organize has unintended societal consequences. Many facilities may be unaware that co-
ownership holds them back, and appreciating the dangers and possibilities that stem from co-
ownership may motivate some decision-makers to extend their mindfulness from cancerous 
chemicals to more ambiguous hazards. 
In conclusion, this thesis answers three important questions – whether, how, and to what 
extent co-ownership influences one aspect of environmental performance. However, the most 
important contribution derives from opening a conversation that links ownership to foreseeable 
harm. While many lawyers may fear such connections, the patterns raise important warning signs 
about how facilities deal with hazardous byproducts. Firms can and do mitigate such harm, but 
co-ownership creates additional challenges and opportunities for addressing hazardous 
byproducts. This dissertation identifies some of the mechanisms hindering joint-ventures’ efforts 
in the hopes that successful prescriptions can be developed to assist co-owners reduce 
disproportionate harm. 
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Appendix A:  
List of Chemicals Examined in the Analysis 
Chemical CAS Number 
4,6-Dinitro-2-sec-butylphenol 88-85-7 
Abamectin 71751-41-2 














Allyl alcohol 107-18-6 
Allyl chloride 107-05-1 
Aluminum (fume or dust) 7429-90-5 
Aminobiphenyl:4- 92-67-1 
Ammonia z 7664-41-7 
Anilazine 101-05-3 




Aroclor 1016, 1X5ML, Transformer 
Oil 50M G/KG 
12674-11-2 










Benzene, 1-methyl-2-nitro- 88-72-2 
Benzidine 92-87-5 
Benzo(a)anthracene - PAH 56-55-3 
Chemical CAS Number 
Benzo(a)phenanthrene - PAH 218-01-9 
Benzo(a)pyrene - PAH 50-32-8 
Benzo(b)fluoranthene - PAH 205-99-2 
Benzo(k)fluoranthene - PAH 207-08-9 
Benzoic acid 65-85-0 
Benzotrichloride 98-07-7 
Benzyl chloride 100-44-7 




Bis (2-chloroethyl) ether 111-44-4 
Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate 117-81-7 
Bis(tributyltin) oxide 56-35-9 






Butyl alcohol:i- 78-83-1 
Butyl alcohol:n- 71-36-3 
Butyl alcohol:sec- 78-92-2 
Butyl alcohol:tert- 75-65-0 







Carbon disulphide 75-15-0 
Carbon tetrachloride 56-23-5 
Catechol 120-80-9 
CFC-11 75-69-4 
CFC -113 Trichlorotrifluoroethane 76-13-1 
CFC-12 75-71-8 
Chlordane 57-74-9 
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Chemical CAS Number 
Chlorfenvinfos 470-90-6 
Chloro-4-nitrobenzene:1- 100-00-5 
























Cresol (and its salts):m- 108-39-4 
Cresol (and its salts):o- 95-48-7 













Demeton-S-Methyl Sulfoxide 301-12-2 
Diaminotoluene (and its salts):2,4- 95-80-7 
Chemical CAS Number 
Diazinon 333-41-5 
Dibenzo(a,h)anthracene - PAH 53-70-3 
Dibromoethane:1,2- 106-93-4 
Dibromomethane 74-95-3 
Dibutyl phthalate 84-74-2 
Dicamba 1918-00-9 











Dichlorophenol (and its salts):2,4- 120-83-2 









Diethanolamine (and its salts) 111-42-2 
Diethyl phthalate 84-66-2 
Diethyl sulphate 64-67-5 
Dimethoate 60-51-5 
Dimethyl phthalate 131-11-3 
Dimethyl sulphate 77-78-1 
Dimethylamine 124-40-3 







Dinitro-o-cresol (and its salts):4,6- 534-52-1 
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Ethyl acrylate 140-88-5 
Ethyl ether 60-29-7 
Ethyl methacrylate 97-63-2 
Ethylbenzene 100-41-4 
Ethylene glycol 107-21-1 
Ethylene oxide 75-21-8 




Fentin acetate 900-95-8 
Fluoranthene - PAH 206-44-0 
Fluorene - PAH 86-73-7 
Folpet 133-07-3 
Formaldehyde 50-00-0 














Chemical CAS Number 
Hexachloroethane 67-72-1 
Hexane:n- 110-54-3 
Hydrazine (and its salts) 302-01-2 
Hydrochloric acid 7647-01-0 
Hydrogen cyanide 74-90-8 
Hydrogen sulphide 7783-06-4 
Hydroquinone (and its salts) 123-31-9 
Indeno(1,2,3-c,d)pyrene - PAH 193-39-5 
Iprodione 36734-19-7 













Methyl acetate 79-20-9 
Methyl acrylate 96-33-3 
Methyl ethyl ketone 78-93-3 
Methyl iodide 74-88-4 
Methyl isobutyl ketone 108-10-1 
Methyl mercury 22967-92-6 
Methyl methacrylate 80-62-6 
Methyl tert-butyl ether 1634-04-4 
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Chemical CAS Number 
Nitrogen Dioxide 10102-44-0 
Nitroglycerin 55-63-0 












Pentachlorophenol (PCP) 87-86-5 
Permethrin 52645-53-1 
Phenol (and its salts) 108-95-2 
Phenylenediamine (and its salts):p- 106-50-3 
Phenylenediamine:m- 108-45-2 
Phenylphenol (and its salts):o- 90-43-7 
Phosgene 75-44-5 
Phoxim 14816-18-3 
Phthalic anhydride 85-44-9 





Propylene oxide 75-56-9 
Propyzamide 23950-58-5 
Pyrazophos 13457-18-6 
Pyrene - PAH 129-00-0 
Pyridine (and its salts) 110-86-1 






Styrene oxide 96-09-3 
Sulphur dioxide 7446-09-5 
Tetrachlorobenzene:1,2,4,5 95-94-3 










































Vanadium (except when in an alloy) 
and its compounds 
7440-62-2 
Vinyl acetate 108-05-4 
Vinyl bromide 593-60-2 
Vinyl chloride 75-01-4 
Vinylidene chloride 75-35-4 
Xylene (all isomers) 1330-20-7 
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Zinc (fume or dust) 7440-66-6 
Zineb 12122-67-7 
zzAcetone - [MOE] 67-64-1 
zzDichloroethane:1,1- - [MOE] 75-34-3 
zzEthyl acetate - [MOE] 141-78-6 
zzHexachloro-1,3-butadiene - [MOE] 87-68-3 
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Appendix B:  
List of Industries Examined in the Analysis 
US SIC 
Code=== 
CAN SIC Industry 
101 0617 Iron ores 
102 0612 Copper ores 
104 0611 Gold and silver ores 
106 0613 Ferroalloy ores, excluding Vanadium 
131 0711 Crude petroleum and natural gas 
149 0629 Miscellaneous nonmetallic minerals 
229 1999 Miscellaneous textile goods 
242 2512 Sawmills and planing mills 
249 2592 Miscellaneous wood products 
261 2711 Pulp mills 
262 2719 Mills, excluding building paper 
281 3721 Industrial inorganic compounds 
282 3731 Plastics materials and synthetics 
284 3761 Soaps, cleaners, and toilet goods 
286 3712 Industrial organic chemicals 
287 3721 Agricultural chemicals 
289 3799 Miscellaneous chemical products 
291 3611 Petroleum refining  
308 1699 Miscellaneous plastics products, not elsewhere classified 
323 3562 Products of purchased glass 
324 3521 Cement, hydraulic 
331 2919 Blast furnace and basic steel products 
334 3922 Secondary nonferrous metals 
335 2961 Nonferrous rolling and drawing 
341 3042 Metal cans and shipping containers 
344 3049 Fabricated structural metal products 
346 3049 Metal forgings and stampings 
347 3041 Metal services, not elsewhere classified 
349 3099 Miscellaneous fabricated metal products 
351 3251 Engines and turbines 
353 3192 Construction and related machinery 
364 3333 Electric lighting and wiring equipment 
371 3251 Motor vehicles and equipment 
399 3999 Miscellaneous manufacturing 
491 4911 Electric services 
495 4999 Sanitary services 
501 5529 Motor vehicles, parts and equipment 
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Appendix C:  
Reflexivity Statement 
 While this dissertation is quantitative by nature, it remains possible that my prior experiences 
and beliefs shaped not only the research itself, but also my interpretations of the analysis. Therefore, I 
am providing a reflexivity statement to allow the reader to consider the ways in which my 
involvement in the research may have acted upon and informed these studies (Nightingale & 
Cromby, 1999). 
 I am a middle aged white male raised in the south central United States. Prior to pursuing a 
PhD, I earned a bachelor of business administration in management and marketing and a master of 
business administration from two conservative universities. I spent nearly ten years working in the 
international banking software industry and my former career provided opportunities to work and live 
in the U.K., Germany, Switzerland, Mexico, and Panama as well as numerous cities in the United 
States and Canada.   
My impetus for returning to university to pursue a PhD in business administration was 
reading Jarrod Diamond’s book, Collapse. While I have always enjoyed nature, neither I nor anyone 
close to me has been directly impacted by environmental degradation or chemicals in the 
environment. Collapse simply encouraged me to more thoughtfully consider how businesses impact 
the natural environment, if society would be able to interpret the warning signs of an ailing 
environment, and if and how businesses could respond to prevent irrevocable harm. I specifically 
decided to pursue my studies within the school of business, because I wanted to focus on business 
solutions to environmental externalities.  
 I believe that managers collectively aspire to minimize their businesses’ environmental 
impacts but primarily focus on economic considerations when making business decisions. I believe 
that the vast majority of firms abide by society’s expectations defined within laws and regulations but 
that managers struggle to adopt socially desired change in the absence of strategic incentives, 
economic enticement, or uniform standards. I believe that sustainability research has the greatest 
opportunity to bring about timely and meaningful change when it provides an open, honest, and 
balanced dialogue about the challenges and opportunities that society and organizations face together. 
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